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I. INTRODUCTION
A. A Statement of Purpose
This is the second in a series of articles which examine the scien-
tific and economic foundations of water pollution control policy as it
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is presently evolving in the United States. As in an earlier article,1
we focus upon a paradigmatic environmental control decision, often
hailed as one of the high points in the American experience,' to expose
the premises of current policy.
On March 2, 1967, the members of the Delaware River Basin
Commission (DRBC) 3 met to adopt a massive program to control
the enormous wasteload imposed upon the Delaware as it flows through
the densely urbanized area centering on Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
In framing policy for the river, the DRBC had the benefit of a pioneer-
ing federal study, in which an expert staff constructed a mathematical
model that simulated the impact of pollutants discharged by the in-
dustries and cities bordering upon the river. Using the model, the
federal Delaware Estuary Comprehensive Study (DECS) attempted to
quantify the costs and benefits of embarking upon a variety of cleanup
programs that were under consideration by the Commission.4
Our focus in this Article will be on the cost-benefit analysis
tendered to the DRBC by the DECS. In attempting a thorough scrutiny
of the IECS Report, we have three major ends in view. First, since
the environmental goals selected by the DRBC in the 1960's have
been imposed upon all industrialized regions by federal statute in the
1970's, 5 we shall ultimately be in a position to evaluate the pollution
control objectives being pursued not only in the Delaware Valley but
throughout the United States. As we consider the premises of the
Delaware effort to be fundamentally misguided, our critique of the
DECS cost-benefit analysis is intended to induce our readers to
question the direction of the current multibillion-dollar effort to control
the pollution of our nation's waters.
Second, in examining the DECS Report carefully, we shall be
able to consider in a concrete context the extent to which cost-benefit
analysis enhances the rationality of decisions made by functioning
I Ackerman & Sawyer, The Uncertain Search for Environmental Policy: Scientific
Factfinding and Rational Decisionmaking Along the Delaware River, 120 U. PA. L. Rv.
419 (1972).
2 See, e.g., A. KNEESE & B. BowER, MANAGING WATER QUALIT 224-35 (1968).
3 The Delaware River Basin Compact establishes the regional jurisdiction of the
DRBC over the water quality of the Delaware River and its tributaries as wel as the
authority to develop hydroelectric power and recreational areas, to promote wildlife con-
servation and flood protection, and to control water supply. The formal acts of consent
to the Compact by the signatory governments may be found in Act of Sept. 27, 1961,
75 Stat. 688; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6501-13 (Supp. 1970); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
32:11D-1 to -115 (1963), as amended, (Supp. 1973); N.Y. CONSERV. LAw §§ 801-12
(McKinney 1967); PA. STAT. AN. tit. 32, §§ 815.101-.106 (1967).
4
FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR,
DELAWARE ESTUARY COMPREHENSIVE STUDY: PRELnIuNARY REPORT AND FINDINGS (1966)
[hereinafter cited as DECS]. The mathematical model is described and analyzed in
Ackerman & Sawyer, supra note 1.
5 See text accompanying notes 159-76 infra.
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agencies. Although theoretical problems in cost-benefit analysis have
generated a substantial literature, the way in which cost-benefit analysis
is actually practiced is deserving of far more scholarly attention than
it has been given.6 Rather than advert summarily to the inevitable
imperfections of cost-benefit analysis in the "real world," one must
treat the problems of practice seriously if the university is to train
students who can analyze the problems concealed by a set of summary
cost-benefit ratios. Moreover, when, as in the instant case, analysis
reveals that a methodology is currently being practiced in the field
under the "cost-benefit" label which bears almost no relationship to
the economist's insights, it seems incumbent upon the academy to
make that fact known. Finally, when the gap between the theory of
cost-benefit analysis and its practice is perceived, both lawyers and
economists can begin to consider the ways in which institutions may
be designed to control the use of the methodology to maximize its
contribution to enlightened decisionmaking.
Third, an analysis of the DECS Report serves as an appropriate
vehicle to consider the relationship between the economist's cost-
benefit methodology and alternative ways of understanding the en-
vironmental problem. It should be no secret that many who are active
in environmental regulation look with grave suspicion upon the efforts
of economists to bring "rationality" to the policymaking process. They
believe that environmental protection generates substantial benefits
which, for one reason or another, are unquantifiable within the con-
fines of the economist's methodology. Consequently, they suggest that
even if a cost-benefit analysis conformed as closely as practicable to
the welfare economist's paradigm, the resulting policy recommenda-
tions should not be given decisive weight. After dealing with the
factors considered by the cost-benefit study, this essay therefore
attempts to provide a structure within which the doubts of the non-
economist may be coherently expressed and given appropriate con-
sideration by decisionmakers.
We hope, then, not only to attempt a substantive critique of
water pollution policy but also to consider the inherent limitations of
the economist's analysis of the issue of environmental degradation.
6 This is not to say that such attention has been totally lacking. Among the recent
works in this area are BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, MEASURING BENEFITS OF GOVERN-MNT
INvEsTiENTS (R. Dorfman ed. 1965); R. HAVEmAN, THE EcoNomic PERFORMANCE OF
PUBLIC INVESTMNT: AN Ex-POST EVALUATION OF WATER RESOURCES INVESTNENTS
(1972); PUBLIC EXPENDITURES AND POLICY ANALYSIS (R. Haveman & J. Margolis eds.
1970); A. Riwnm, SYSTEMATIC TmNKING FOR SocIAL AcTION (1971); Margolis, Secon-
dary Benefits, External Economies, and the Justification of Public Investment, in AmaER-
ICAN ECONOMCc ASSOCIATION, READINGS IN WELFARE ECONOMICS 372 (K. Arrow & T.
Scitovsky eds. 1969).
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In a subsequent study, these issues will be developed further, both
by considering the weight each of the five voting members of the
DRBC-Governors Hughes (New Jersey), Rockefeller (New York),
Shafer (Pennsylvania) and Terry (Delaware), and Secretary of the
Interior Udall-gave to the DECS Report, and by assessing the ways
in which the DRBC's 1967 decision has been implemented up to the
present time.7 It is only on the basis of this further analysis that it
will be possible to consider the ways institutions may be structured to
best develop the environmental policies suggested in the present Arti-
cle. Consequently, the critical issues of institutional design will not be
considered here, but will be reserved for our book length treatment.
B. The Pollution Problem on the Delaware:
A Review of the DECS Approach
Before one can assess the ambitious DECS attempt to analyze
the costs and benefits of environmental improvement, it is necessary
to understand the terms in which the DECS staff and other leading
researchers seek to describe the physical phenomena which the layman
associates with the "pollution problem." As we have explored the na-
ture and limits of contemporary scientific factfinding efforts in an
earlier Article in this Review,8 the briefest summary will serve our
purposes here. The DECS Report focused principally on a single water
quality parameter, dissolved oxygen (DO), which traditionally has
been of the greatest concern for professionals in water quality manage-
ment. DO is important for two reasons. First, if oxygen levels fall
below three or four parts per million (ppm), and if the oxygen defi-
ciencies are substantial and sustained, the resident fish population will
die and migrant species will find it impossible to survive their jour-
neys.' Second, if DO levels plummet further and approach zero, the
river will generate a stench-similar to that of rotten eggs-which can
make recreation and residence in or about the afflicted region unattrac-
tive. While river stench is, as yet, not a serious problem in any portion
of the estuary,10 the survival of fish and other forms of aquatic life is
of considerable concern. During the summertime, DO levels of one
ppm are common in the highly industrialized segments of the river be-
tween Philadelphia and Wilmington, making it impossible for a well-
7 B. ACKERmAN, S. RosE-AcxmudaA, J. SAWYER & D. HENDERSON, THE UNCERTAMN
SEARCH FOR ENViRONmNTAL QUALITY cbs. 11-19 (forthcoming) [hereinafter cited as B.
AcEzamAN].
8 Ackerman & Sawyer, supra note 1.
9 See id. 437.
10 Interviews with DRBC, Pennsylvania and New Jersey personnel, summer 1972.
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developed resident fish population to survive in, or migratory fish (like
the shad) to pass through, this "critical zone."
Like a number of other pollutants, materials which deplete the
river's oxygen supply have a localized effect: their impact diminishes
over time from the point of discharge. Thus, oxygen depletion is a
problem in the heavily industrialized section of the river between
Philadelphia and Wilmington, but as discharges containing oxygen-
demanding wastes diminish in intensity below Wilmington, the DO
profile improves quite rapidly, as suggested in Figure 1, reaching
near-saturation levels before the estuary joins the Delaware Bay;
similarly, DO levels on the estuary above Philadelphia are considerably
higher than those in the "critical region." In order to provide a more
precise analysis of the impact of discharges on the DO profile, the
DECS developed a scientific model, which divided the eighty-six-mile
estuary into the thirty sections shown on the map in Figure 2; after
the staff measured all discharges into each section, the model predicted
the extent.to which these inputs would impair water quality, measured
chiefly by DO, as they were carried into other sections of the river.
Considering all polluting inputs in all sections of the river simulta-
neously, the model then attempted to provide a cause-and-effect
FIGURE 1
PROFILE oF AVERAGE SUMmER DISSOLVED OXYGEN IN 1964"
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11 Ackerman & Sawyer, supra note 1, at 442 (Fig. 4), based on G. Shaumberg, Water
Pollution Control in the Delaware Estuary 44, May 1967 (unpublished thesis on file at
Harvard College Library).
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explanation of the river's varying water quality, and, by extension, to
provide a set of predictions concerning the water quality which would
result under various cutback programs.
Armed with a scientific model that described the physical pa-
rameters of the problem, the DECS could undertake an economic
analysis of the costs of improving water quality. The staff began by
estimating the marginal costs that each polluter would incur as it was
required to eliminate more and more oxygen-demanding material from
its waste stream. Once these data were obtained, the DECS could use
its cause-and-effect model to determine the impact on the DO profile
1 2 DECS, supra note 4, at 34, (Fig. 20).
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of imposing one or another set of cleanup costs upon each polluter.
Finally, the DECS staff arranged for the University of Pennsylvania's
Institute for Environmental Studies (IES) to make estimates of the
benefits which would accrue to various water users as a result of each
of the control programs hypothesized by the DECS.
When the DECS issued its report in the summer of 1966, then, it
provided decisionmakers with a cost-benefit analysis which seemed to
clarify greatly the ultimate decisionmaking problem. The DECS Report
considered the merits of five different water quality objectives for the
polluted estuary. Objective V contemplated maintaining indefinitely
existing DO levels along the river; each of the four other proposals
established cutback programs which the scientific model predicted
would improve DO levels, with objective IV contemplating the smallest
improvement, and I, the greatest.13 Under the regulatory system the
DRBC was most seriously considering,14 the DECS generated the
following figures.
TABLE 11
COST-BENEFIT ESTIMATES OF DECS POLLUTION CONTROL PLANS
(Present Values, 1964 Dollars, Discounted at 3% for Twenty Years)
High Estimate-
Minimum DO Low Estimate
Program Tolerated (ppm) Cost of Benefits
I 4.5 $490 million $355-155 million
II 4.0 275 " 320-135 "
III 3.0 155 " 310-125 "
IV 2.5 110 " 280-115 "
V 1.0 30
If the political officials on the DRBC had simply conceived it to
be their task to follow the recommendations of the DECS staff, it
should be clear that they would not have considered any cleanup
program more ambitious than IV: moving from IV to III, for instance,
would generate at a maximum $30 million more in benefits while costs
would increase by $45 million; and Program II would require an extra
13 For a detailed description of the objective sets, see DECS, supra note 4, at 54-58.14 This system required polluters located near one another to remove equal percent-
ages of their wasteloads. The system is analyzed and alternatives considered in B. ACKER-
MAN, supra note 7, chs. 15-19.
15 The benefit estimates are for recreation only and come from DECS, supra note 4,
at 77 (Table 20). The cost estimates come from id. 66 (Table 16) (B-Zoned). Capital
costs are counted as occurring in the present with operating and maintenance costs dis-
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investment of $120 million over Program III to obtain at most a $10
million gain. Despite this, the DRBC not only rejected Program IV,
but Program III as well, and proceeded to adopt a slightly modified
version of Program II to serve as the water quality policy objective
for the Delaware.
The decision on the Delaware thus poses a sharp challenge to the
adherents of cost-benefit methodology. Were the politicians justified in
rejecting the technocratic report? To what extent did the document
mislead more than it informed? Is cost-benefit analysis inevitably in-
adequate in informing environmental control decisions? It is to these
questions that we now turn in scrutinizing first the DECS cost esti-
mates and then its benefit calculations. We shall conclude by suggesting
that the ultimate decisionmakers were justified in doubting the reli-
ability of the DECS numbers and suspecting that the economist's
insights contained inherent limitations. Nevertheless, we shall argue
that the ultimate policymakers drew precisely the wrong inference
from their suspicions. Instead of deciding that a far higher level of
cleanup was justified than was indicated by the DECS calculations, a
sophisticated consideration of the factors involved would have over-
whelmingly indicated that only a much more modest cleanup effort,
and one which was not primarily concerned with DO levels, made sense
along the Delaware. In reaching this conclusion, we do not mean to
suggest that substantial expenditures on water pollution control do
not make sense. After tracing the sources of failure in our present
program, we shall attempt to advance the basic principles of an
environmental policy which would generate substantial returns to a
society which is committed to ameliorating the consequences of
twentieth-century industrialism. Indeed, it is precisely because we be-
lieve that environmentalism has values of lasting significance that it
seems to us important to urge the reconsideration of a program, costing
billions of dollars across the nation, which will ultimately generate
such profound disappointment with the fruits of the environmental
revolution that much that is of real value will be abandoned along with
much that is simply faddish.
counted at 3% for 20 years. The benefit estimates are the present value of a 20-year
stream of benefits also discounted at 3%.
The benefit estimates represent the additional recreation benefits over and above
those generated by the river in its 1964 condition. The cost estimates include the esti-
mated $30,000,000 cost of maintaining 1964 conditions, id., and represent costs over and
above those incurred in 1964 for pollution control. Thus, if the appropriate data were
available, the benefits column should include the benefits that would be lost if the
$30,000,000 were not spent. Unfortunately, the DECS did not attempt to estimate the
value of present benefits. As long as this figure is greater than $30,000,000, however, the
choice of the optimal level of pollution control will be unaffected by this omission.
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II. COUNTING THE COSTS
The DECS economic analysis was profoundly shaped by the way
in which its scientific model described the "facts" about the Delaware's
pollution problem. As a result of the model's emphasis on DO, the
economic analysis, naturally enough, concentrated upon estimating
the costs of removing oxygen demanding wastes and only incidentally
considered other pollutants.' Even when the nature of the pollution
problem had been so drastically simplified, however, the DECS found
it necessary to focus its concerns even more narrowly in order to make
headway on what it considered to be the most important dimensions
of the problem of cost estimation. We do not mean to suggest in any
way that this decision to narrow the field of inquiry was an unwise
one. It was necessary for the DECS to simplify its task at the be7
ginning of its ambitious investigation. But the consequence of many
of the simplifying assumptions proved to be distortions of reality which
substantially limited the range and validity of the cost estimates which
were provided to the DRBC at the time of its initial decision in 1967.
A. Narrowing the Range of Inquiry
1. The "Forty-Four" Polluters
The sources of oxygen-demanding wastes imposed upon the
estuary are many and diverse: the hundred municipalities and firms
discharging directly into the estuary are only the most visible com-
ponents of a larger problem. In addition, oxygen is constantly de-
manded by wastes entering the estuary from the upper Delaware above
Trenton and from the major tributaries entering the main stem at
various points, and by the blanket of sludge-often from ten to
twenty feet thick-on the river's bottom. 7 In order to make its task
manageable, however, the DECS concentrated its energies upon the
forty-four most important point-source polluters discharging directly
into the estuary.' This decision was justified on the ground that these
forty-four sources contributed more than ninety-five percent of all
16 After calculating the cost of reaching the DO objectives, the DECS staff checked
the results to determine whether the standards for acidity and bacteria were met. If not,
the costs of meeting these standards were added. Id. 63, 66 (Table 16). These additional
costs were relatively small. For example, of the $275,000,000 cost to reach Objective Set
II, $20,000,000 represents the additional costs of bacteria removal. Costs of removing
particular poisons were not explicitly calculated. In fact, a DECS footnote states that
other water use goals (except chlorides) were assumed to be met by DO, pH and bac-
terial control measures. Id. 66 (Table 16, n.3). Furthermore, the DECS did not present
the results of looking at the program in reverse by first estimating the cost of meeting
pH and bacterial objectives and then recording the additional cost of meeting DO ob-
jectives. As we shall see, this would have been a most useful exercise for policymakers.
17 See Ackerman & Sawyer, supra note 1, at 441-44.
18 See id. 465.
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wastes emitted by point sources riparian to the main stem.' 9 In fact,
however, when other sources of waste are taken into account, the
DECS forty-four polluters contribute only sixty-five percent of the
total load imposed on the estuary. Most importantly, the nonestuarine
branches of the river contributed twelve percent of the estuary's load
in 1964. Since a number of the major tributaries are the scenes of
rapid industrial and residential growth, the waste from this source will
increase substantially over time.2" Nevertheless, by focusing its concern
solely upon polluters on the main stem, the DECS ignored this in-
creasingly important cost in its estimates.
2. The "Steady State" Assumption
Whenever it rains heavily in the Delaware Valley, oxygen-demand-
ing inputs into the river rise dramatically, principally because of the
combined storm and sanitary sewer systems which prevail in the
estuary's major cities: Trenton, Philadelphia, Camden and Wilmington.
In these combined systems, the same set of sewer pipes serve as con-
duits for both the waste water generated by the normal activities of
the city's inhabitants and the far larger volume of water which runs
off the streets during a rainstorm. Consequently, when after a storm
the operators of municipal treatment plants are confronted with an
inundation of rain water-cum-sewage which exceeds capacity, they are
obliged to divert the waste stream directly into the Delaware without
19 DECS, supra note 4, at 62.
20 While the old central cities along the main stem of the river (Philadelphia, Tren-
ton, Wilmington, Chester, Bristol, Marcus Hook, Morrisville, Camden, Bordentown and
Burlington) suffered a population loss of over 4% between 1960 and 1970, the remainder
of the Trenton and Philadelphia Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA's) and
the Delaware and New Jersey portions of the Wilmington SMSA gained 22% in popula-
tion; the bulk of this growth occurred in the drainage basins of tributaries of the Dela-
ware. See I U.S. BUREAU OF TiE CENSUS, UNITED STATES CENSUS OF POPULATION, 1970,
pt. A, § 1 pt. 9, § 2 pts. 32, 40 (1971) [hereinafter cited as U.S. CENSUS 1970]. Sim-
ilarly, population projections for the Delaware Valley predict the older urban areas will
suffer a 2.2% loss in population between 1960 and 1985, that the older suburbs including
the older towns other than Philadelphia, Camden and Trenton will grow by 39%, and
that the remainder of the region will grow by 108%. See DELAWARE STATE PLANNING
OFFICE, FINAL POPULATION PROJECTIONS: DELAWARE COUNTIES, 1970-2000, ADVANCE RE-
PORT (1972) [hereinafter cited as POPULATION PROJECTIONS: DELAWARE COUNTIES, 1970-
2000]; DELAWARE VALLEY REGIONAL PLANNING COMM'N, 1985 REGIONAL PROJECTIONS
FOR THE DELAWARE VALLEY, REPORT No. 1 (1967) [hereinafter cited as DVRPC, 1985
PROJECTIONS]; OFFICE OF BuSInESs ECONOmiCS, DIV. OF PLANNING & RESEARCH, NEW
JERSEY DEP'T OF LABOR & INDUSTRY, NEW JERSEY PRELIMINARY POPULATION PROJEC-
TIONS (1971) [hereinafter cited as NEw JERSEY POPULATION PROJECTIONS]; WILInIG-
TON COMM'N ON ZONING & PLANNING, 1985 ESTIMATES OF LAND USE, POPULATION, AND
E1PLOYMENT WITHIN WILMINGTON (1966). For definitions of the "older urban areas"
(Rings 1 & 2) and "older suburbs" (Ring 3), see DELAWARE VALLEY REGIONAL PLAN-
NING COmmA'N, THE IMPACT OF HIGHWAY CONSTRUCTION ON THE EcONOxary, TECHNICAL
RECORD No. 6, at A-I to A-2 (1972).
Value-added in manufacturing establishments located in the Delaware Valley but out-
side of the old center cities on the main stem equals value-added within these old cities,
and the proportion generated by the suburbs is growing. It was 48% of the total in 1963
and 50% in 1967. 3 U.S. BUREAU oF THE CENSUS, CENSUS Or MANTJFACTURERS, 1967.
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any treatment whatsoever. To make matters worse, very substantial
quantities of street debris are also swept directly into the river. Thus,
on about ten days a year when the sewers overflow, wastes discharged
into the river more than double, seriously impairing the oxygen supply
during the subsequent week.2 ' If a pollution program is to permit a
broad range of aquatic life to maintain itself in previously heavily
polluted sections of the river, the costs of dealing with the storm
sewer problem should be one of the most important components of the
analysis. For fish must breathe on foul days as well as fair.
Unfortunately, however, the DECS scientific investigation was
structured so as to obscure the importance of the storm sewer problem.
Instead of considering the way in which sudden transient impulses
affected water quality, the DECS scientific team adopted a simplifying
assumption common enough in model building to have a name: "the
steady state approach." Ignoring all transient phenomena, the DECS
staff treated their problem as if waste discharges and river conditions
remained constant over time. 2 Thus, instead of confronting the con-
sequences of these massive intermittent discharges upon water quality,
the DECS scientific model treated storm sewers as if they constantly
discharged a relative trickle into the river day in and day out. Because
on an annual average basis storm sewers account for only four percent
of total oxygen-demanding wastes,2" the DECS model could not express
the basic importance of this source in the overall pollution control
scheme.24
As the scientific model provided the framework in which the
economic analysis was to be performed, it became a relatively simple
matter for the cost estimates to fail to come to grips with the vexing
sewer issue. After all, sewers only accounted for four percent of the
2 1 Ackerman & Sawyer, supra note 1, at 460.
22 To be more precise, the DECS staff did recognize the importance of storm water
overflow and performed a special study to determine the frequency of such impulses and
their impact on water quality. DECS, supra note 4, at 24-25 (Fig. 13). Moreover, the
DECS Report notes that sewer discharges pose a special problem and lists control of
storm water discharges as one of the methods by which water quality might be im-
proved. Id. at 24. Nothing more is said, however, and in the actual cost-benefit analysis,
the variability of storm sewer overflow is not considered.
2 3 See Porges & Seizer, Allocation of Stream Capacity in the Delaware River Estuary,
in PROCEEDINGS or TE SECOND Mm-ATLANTIC INDUSTRIAL WASTE CONFERENCE 71, 80
(Fig. 4) (1968). BOD is defined as the number of pounds of oxygen that will be con-
sumed in the biochemical oxidation of the organic impurity present. T. Ca.iw, WATER
AND ITS ImPuRITIES 243 (1963).
2 4 Industrial loads are also extremely variable, depending upon the products being
manufactured and the level of operations. DECS, supra note 4, at 22, notes this vari-
ability but the staff did not incorporate the information into their analysis. Certainly one
possible way to improve river conditions during critical periods would be to require in-
d'ustrial polluters to dump less on such days than on others. As the volume of waste is
under the control of the plant management and does not depend on the vagaries of the
weather, such an approach could well be quite useful.
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"average" daily load-so the model assured the staff. Consequently,
it seemed sensible to avoid any discussion of the costs of correcting this
problem in all the DECS published writings. If the DECS had faced
the problem, it would have found that the costs of coping with it were
very high. In fact, it will apparently cost at least $1 billion just to
control Philadelphia's storm sewer problem (and, indeed, this large
sum may well be far too conservative).25 In other words, dealing with
this four percent of the "average" daily load may be far more expensive
than controlling the normal wastes generated by the estuary's pol-
luters, even if these discharges were reduced as drastically as contem-
plated by the most stringent cleanup program of the five advanced to
the DRBC for consideration.
3. Steady State Thinking and the Problem of Growth
While the importance of considering regional growth was per-
ceived, the DECS treatment of the problem was primitive and failed
significantly to transcend the limitations of steady state thinking. In
seeking to estimate the costs of compliance for a twenty-year period
between 1965 and 1985,28 the staff assumed that none of the twenty-
two firms in the sample would leave the Valley during that period or-
even more importantly-that no major new industrial dischargers
would locate on the banks of the river .2  This second assumption
seems particularly untenable when it is recognized that substantial
quantities of shoreline in the highly industrialized Philadelphia-
Camden metropolitan area are still available for development on the
New Jersey side of the river, and that a new bridge is under construc-
tion which will link this land economically to markets in Pennsylvania
and the West. 8
While it is obvious that any treatment of these new industries
must contain elements of uncertainty, to ignore completely what
almost surely will occur because its details cannot be known is to
pursue hard data at the cost of failing to generate sensible estimates.
Instead the DECS might have produced a series of cost estimates
envisioning a number of plausible scenarios for the development of
vacant land in the urbanized zone over the next generation. Such an
2 5 Ackerman & Sawyer, supra note 1, at 462 n.77.
26 The validity of using a 20-year time horizon is critically examined in Section V.E
infra, as is the DECS use of a 39 discount rate to calculate the present value of
costs and benefits accruing over time.
2 7 DECS, supra note 4, at 62.
2 8 The compact providing for the Chester-Bridgeport Bridge was finally approved
in August 1966, when the DECS was still at work on its report. The bridge is scheduled
for completion in 1974. Interview with Delaware River Port Authority personnel, Aug.
1972.
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approach would, of course, require a number of informed guesses as
to the nature of industries moving to the river, their probable loca-
tions, the amount of waste they will generate and the costs of treatment
at the time the industries enter the region. Nevertheless, it would
give the decisionmaker a sense of the probable range in which the cost
of compliance would fall. This result seems far better than providing
the policymaker with a single number which ignores the possibility of
entry entirely.
If we limit our concern to the way in which the DECS dealt with
the forty-four largest existing polluters, the staff's treatment of temporal
change again appears overly simplistic. In attempting to obtain cost
data from the dischargers themselves, the DECS reports that the staff
asked each of the forty-four polluters to "reflect load increases for
about a 10 year period [from 1964 to 1975] . . . by estimating the
cost of treatment to maintain certain levels of discharge through that
time period."29 Although the staff expected the polluters to report sub-
stantial growth, only nine of the forty-four dischargers responded that
they were anticipating any increase in waste production between 1965
and 1975.30 Since all nine growing dischargers were small municipal-
ities,3 the DECS questionnaires generated the rather surprising con-
clusion that the cost of controlling future growth was a mere $20
million.2 The DECS explained this small figure by claiming that any
increase in raw loads which might be expected to occur would be
"accounted for by reduction of waste through plant modification, and
by revenue obtained through product recovery. 1
33
There is, however, a far more plausible explanation for the failure
29 DECS, supra note 4, at 62; telephone interview with David H. Marks, former
member of the DECS staff, Apr. 1972. G. Schaumberg, supra note 11, at 50-51, however,
reports that the question asked was actually:
How much would it cost you to reduce BOD discharges by the year 1975? Give
present discharges and the cost to reduce BOD discharges (nearly) to zero.
If possible give one or two levels of BOD reduction and the corresponding
costs of achieving these reductions. Be sure to consider process change as an
alternative to waste treatment in your estimation of costs.
This passage is surely ambiguous about how growth in loads should be considered,
and it is not surprising that numerous meetings with the polluters were necessary in
order to explain what data were actually desired. Interview with Professor Matthew J.
Sobel, former member of the DECS staff, Yale University, Apr. 1972 [hereinafter cited
as Interview with M. Sobel].
30 Letter from Ethan T. Smith, Office of Water Programs, Environmental Protection
Agency, Region II (formerly of the DECS staff) to Professor Susan Ackerman, June 28,
1971 [hereinafter cited as Letter from E. Smith).
31 In fact, DECS, supra note 4, at 31, indicates that estimates of load increases were
made for all municipalities. According to staff member Smith, however, this was not
actually done for 13 major sources. Letter from E. Smith, supra note 30.
32 The actual figure given in the DECS Report for Objective Set V (which involved
maintaining 1964 conditions) is $30,000,000. However, the study states that $10,000,000
of this represents the cost of requiring primary treatment facilities to be installed for 5
sources which did not then treat their wasteloads at all, DECS, supra note 4, at 66;
a sum that should not be included in the cost of maintaining 1964 conditions because
the investment in primary facilities would, in fact, improve conditions.
83 Id. 30.
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of the questionnaires to reveal substantial wasteload growth. In in-
dustry the typical addressees of such questionnaires are plant managers,
who are unlikely to have an accurate view of expansion plans being
made at the head office and respond conservatively by assuming no
growth at all in the future. Moreover, it is doubtful that even head
office personnel-if their views were obtained--would have very
clear plans over a ten- or fifteen-year time horizon.84
While questionnaires have their place, they clearly cannot provide
the sole data source for a sensible estimate of the costs of compliance
over time. At the very least the questionnaires ihust be checked for
consistency with estimates of overall regional growth devised either by
the staff itself or by other agencies concerned with regional develop-
ment. The DECS had access to such regional estimates, and in fact
discussed them in its 1966 Report, without, however, recognizing the
importance of this information in assessing the validity of its own
growth egtimates. The regionaf growth analysis portrayed a booming
Delaware Valley in which population would grow by thirty percent
between 1964 and 1975 and industry would develop at a far more
rapid rate. Translating these aggregate estimates into wasteload pro-
jections, the staff prophesied that by 1975 municipal loads would be
232 percent, and industrial wastes 187 percent, of their 1964 levels."
If the staff had compared these aggregate estimates with the data
accumulated by questionnaire, they would have perceived at once the
dramatic inconsistency. If any credence had been given to the overall
regional estimates, it would have been clear that it would cost far
more than $20 million to control future growth. In saying this, we
do not mean to suggest that the regional growth figures are any more
correct than the questionnaire data. 6 The divergence, however, sug-
34 We have discussed in the text only those data collection problems involved in the
questionnaire technique. Our interviews suggest, however, that the DECS did not even
attempt to obtain cost estimates from the 22 municipalities in its sample. Instead, the
DECS generated its own cost estimates, based upon each municipality's raw wasteload.
While standard formulas exist in engineering handbooks which do provide the basis for
crud6 cost estimates based on municipal wasteload, these formulas can only be rough first
approximations. This is especially true for towns that treat industrial, as well as domestic,
waste. Interview with M. Sobel, supra note 29.
35 DECS, supra note 4, at 29. The DECS projected raw wasteloads generated by
point-source polluters along the Delaware Estuary in 1975. These estimates show that
industrial raw loads are expected to grow from 700,000 lbs. of carbonaceous oxygen de-
mand per day in 1964 to 1,200,000 lbs. per day in 1975. These estimates were obtained,
the DECS explains, by considering the major Standard Industrial Classifications repre-
sented along the estuary, estimating production in dollars for those discharging directly
into the estuary, projecting this production rate over time and estimating raw load by
using factors that related units of pollution to dollars of production in each time period.
Technical change was accounted for in a rough way by changes in the factors relating
pollution to dollars of output. Municipal loads were expected to grow even more dra-
matically from 1,200,000 lbs. per day in 1964 to 2,800,000 lbs. per day in 1975. Id. 29-30.
36The actual increase in population in the Delaware Valley between 1960 and 1970
was 12%, see U.S. CENSUS, 1970, supra note 20, and there is no reason to expect a sud-
den spurt between 1970 and 1974 to support the prediction of a 30%- jump. In fact,
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gests the magnitude of the problem and the degree to which the DECS
failure to confront the problem flawed its analysis. Of course, if the
DECS had confronted the problem squarely, it would not have been
possible to resolve it in any simple way. Inevitably, instead of pre-
senting decisionmakers with a single number which purported to indi-
cate the cost of a given control program, the staff would have been
obliged to suggest that compliance costs would vary considerably under
plausible growth scenarios.
3 7
4. Handling the Data
Having derived each polluter's cost curve on the basis of question-
naire data, the DECS problems in data manipulation were not at an.
end. First, in order to use a linear program which calculated the cost
of reaching each of the proposed water quality objectives, the staff
was constrained to choose only a finite set of points for each polluter
representing the costs of reaching certain levels of waste removal.
The cost of waste removal at any intermediate point was assumed to
lie on the straight line connecting the chosen points, exemplified by
A in Figure 3. Such an approximation may lead to serious over- or
underestimates of costs if the solution to the linear program occurs at
a point such as E in Figure 3, where the linear approximation differs-
substantially from the actual cost of cleanup, as portrayed by B in
Figure 3. Although in the early phase of its work the DECS experi-
mented with treatment cost points in order to select those points that
best approximated continuous cost estimates in the neighborhood of
the solution,3" this practice seems to have been abandoned in later
work when industry, at least, provided some hard data concerning the
costs of attaining one, two or three levels of treatment.3 9
projections of the DVRPC and the states of Delaware and New Jersey indicate that
population in the region is only expected to grow by an additional 7% between 1970
and 1975. See DVRPC, 1985 REGxoNiAu PROyECTIONS, supra note 20, at 7 (Table 2-1).
Total employment grew by only 12% over the same period, BuREAu O'F LABOR STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP'T or LABOR, EmPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS: STATES AND AREAs, 1939-1970 (1971)
and this figure also appears inconsistent with a growth of 187% in industrial waste loads
between 1964 and 1975.
38 The problem is not so intractable as it might appear at first, however, as a few
dischargers account for the bulk of the waste dumped into the river and obtaining growth
estimates for these large polluters alone would result in a good estimate of overall growth.
Of the total load discharged by point-source polluters in 1964, 41% came from Phila-
delphia's 3 treatment plants. When Camden, Wilmington and the DuPont plant at
Chambers, N.J., are taken into consideration, 64% of the entire 1964 discharge is already
accounted for. The addition of the next 12 largest dischargers (10 industries and 2
municipalities) raises the percentage covered to 88%. These figures are derived from
DRBC data available at the DRBC.
S Interview with M. Sobel, supra note 29.
39 Evidence for this statement consists of three sets of cost data provided by the
DECS staff to different researchers over the years. For a discussion of this data, see
Appendix A, infra.
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FIGURE 3
HYPOTHETICAL POLLUTION CONTOL COST FUNCTION
FOR A DISCHARGER wrrH A GIVEN RAW LOAD
A
B
PerCentage of Waste Treated 10
The demands of the linear program are reflected again in the
DECS treatment of capital expenses as perfectly divisible. Imagine
that a firm now treating at sixty-five percent reported to the DECS
that it would require a capital investment of $500,000 to raise its
treatment level to eighty-five percent. DECS assumed that if only
eighty percent treatment were required, an investment of only $375,000
would be needed. In fact, this degree of flexibility may not be possible.
The whole capital investment needed for eighty-five percent treatment
may be required to treat to somewhat lower levels than eighty-five
percent, so that only operating costs will be saved. Similarly, if the
standard is eighty-six or eighty-seven percent, no new investment may
be required and operating costs alone will rise. While the indivisibility
problem may thus result in either an overestimate or an underestimate
of compliance costs, our own manipulation of the DECS data reveals
that if we assumed capital to be indivisible, the total costs of attaining
the DRBC's objective increased by fifteen percent or $40 million. °
Although this assumption is as unrealistic as the one indulged in by
the DECS, it serves to demonstrate the extent to which even a minor
40 This increased level of costs is an upper bound as the estimate was obtained by
assumipg that if the load removed at one data point were exceeded by only a pound,
then the total capital cost of the load removed at the next data point would be incurred.
Using the data in Appendix A, infra, such an estimate was relatively simple to obtain
given the scheme, described in B. AcE:ERmA, supra note 7, chs. 15-19, chosen by the
DRBC to apportion the cleanup burden among polluters.
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modification in methodology affects predictions wrien the data base is
as weak as the one upon which the DECS operated.
To make matters worse, it is not at all clear that substantial im-
provement in the quality of data would be easy to achieve. One al-
ternative is to develop comprehensive information about the costs of
pollution control in different industries. While roughly accurate general
cost information already exists for municipal sewage treatment,4'
estimating such data for industry is a far more difficult problem. A
firm's entire production process must be understood in order to dis-
cover the possibilities of waste-saving process change as an alternative
to separate treatment at the end of the process. Although pathbreaking
efforts have been made,42 we are far from the day when analysts will
possess studies for many different industries relating plant age and
product mix to waste water characteristics and waste reduction costs.
The issue is further complicated by the fact that the current interest
in pollution control should lead to a shift of engineering and scientific
talent into this field with a consequent increase in the rate of technical
change. The uncertainties haunting the DECS data will be typical of
all but the most ambitious and expensive efforts within the foreseeable
future.
5. Conclusions: Economic Science and Policy Formulation
Each of the present writers encounters in his monthly perusal of
the journals a large number of empirical studies with far greater
methodological difficulties than we have encountered in the DECS
Report. The latter, however, cannot be evaluated simply in academic
terms. As the Report was used to inform an important decision, it was
imperative that the analytical team be acutely aware of the way in
which its results would be used and misused in the decisionmaking
process. From this perspective, it seems quite wrong to generate a
single set of numbers to depict "the" cost of reaching one or another
413 FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF THE IN-
TERIOR, THE ECONOmncs OF CLEAN WATER (1970). For engineering specifications, see B.
GOODmAN, MANUAL FOR ACTIVATED SLUDGE SEWAGE TREATMENT (1971); J. WHITE, THE
DESIGN OF SEWERS AND SEWAGE TREATMENT WORKS (1970).
4 2 See, e.g., G. L6S & A. KNESE, THE EcoNoMIcs oF WATER UTLIZATION IN THE
BEET SUGAR INDUSTRY (1968), C. RUSSELL, RESIDUALS MANAGENENT IN INDUSTRY: A
CASE STUDY IN PETROLEUM REFINING (1973). For a statement of the difficulties of ob-
taining industry-by-industry pollution control cost data, see 2 FEDERAL WATER POLLU-
TION CONTROL ADMINITRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, THE COST OF CLEAN WATER AND
ITS ECONOMLIC IMPACT pt. II, at 91 (1968).
Under the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, however, the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) is required to perform this difficult task of estimating
costs as a preliminary to setting discharge standards applicable to various classes of
industries. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1314(b) (1) (B) (Supp. 1973). It seems plain, however, that given
the limitations of present understanding, the EPA's cost estimates of various levels of
cutback will of necessity be speculative and imprecise.
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of the pollution programs under consideration, without emphasizing
the limiting assumptions which were necessary to obtain the numbers.
The best tack would have been to provide a series of estimates under a
range of plausible hypotheses. At the very least, however, the following
warning should have been appended to the DECS figures:
WARNING TO DECISIONMAKERS: In providing these
cost estimates, we have concentrated exclusively upon the
costs of treatment anticipated by forty-four polluters on the
assumption that each treats his own waste. Our estimates
therefore do not take into account projected increases in
waste loadings, from tributaries and the location of new
polluters on the main stem. Moreover, our consideration of
the costs of treating growth in the wasteloads of the forty-
four polluters on the main portion of the river relies upon
information derived from questionnaires which seems incon-
sistent with regional growth projections. Thus, it could well
be that our estimates of compliance cost are seriously under-
stated.
Finally, we have not considered the cost of solving the
acute storm sewer problems experienced by Trenton, Phila-
delphia, Camden and Wilmington, even though if this problem
is not corrected, the anticipated benefits of a water quality
improvement program may in large measure fail to material-
ize. An informed guess places the cost of dealing with the
sewers in excess of a billion dollars.
The DECS staff, we are sure, were perfectly capable in 1966 of ap-
pending such a warning to their Report. They failed to do so not
because they lacked the ability but because they failed to appreciate
the demands of the policymaking context in which they were operating.
It is obvious, of course, that lay decisionmakers would be most im-
pressed with a report which presented an unambiguous set of numbers
apparently based upon a complex and sophisticated scientific model.
Nevertheless, if reasoned economic analysis is to play an important
role in policy formulation, its practitioners must not promise more than
they can reasonably expect to deliver, or seem to deliver more than
they do. Otherwise, disappointed expectations may lead over time to
a complete rejection of systematic thought as an aid to framing public
policy.
B. Beyond 1966: Dealing with Cost Overruns
If the DECS had discharged its warning function, decisionmakers
would have found it most difficult to avoid taking steps to assure that
the costs of compliance would be carefully monitored over time. In
fact, however, neither the DECS nor the DRBC has attempted system-
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atically to refine the initial cost estimates. Consequently, when new
rough estimates were made indicating far higher costs, it was easy for
the decisionmaking agencies to ignore their policy implications or,
worse yet, to suppress their publication.
1. Official Revisions of the Cost Data
When the DRBC made its initial decision to select a slightly
modified version of Program II as its water quality objective, the
DECS enterprise lost much of its vitality. Only three of the original
researchers remained at the Federal Water Quality Administration
regional office which had jurisdiction over the Delaware Valley. Al-
though required to spend the bulk of their time on other projects,
these staffers made conscientious efforts to improve the initial cost
estimates as best they could without the aid of substantial additional
resources.
First, cost data were obtained on forty-seven small municipal
polluters to supplement the original analysis of the forty-four most
important estuarine dischargers. Since these small polluters con-
tributed no more than five percent of the point-source load on the
estuary,43 the new data increased the total expected costs of reaching
the DRBC water quality goal by only ten percent.44 More importantly,
the staff reconsidered the 1966 Report's estimate that an investment
of only $20 million would be required to deal adequately with antici-
pated growth in wasteloads between 1965 and 1975. Finding the
initial estimates far too low, they jacked up the price of dealing with
growth to $140 million.45 Although we can well understand why the
early estimate was found to be so seriously mistaken, it remains far
from clear how this new number was obtained. When queried by the
authors, one of the remaining staffers explained that
[t]he later estimate of 140 million included [the] nine
sources [originally considered by the 1966 Report] plus
numerous other municipal sources which in our opinion must
experience additional costs to abate increasing loads if popula-
tion growth continues, even if they are to discharge no greater
load than in 1964.46
So far as it appears from this response, no effort was made to address
43 Cost functions for these polluters were estimated by combining population data
and information on existing facilities with engineering cost estimates to obtain separate
estimates for each small town. Interviews with Alvin R. Morris & Ethan T. Smith, DECS
staff, summer 1970.
44 Letter from E. Smith, supra note 30.
45 Smith & Morris, Systems Analysis for Optimal Water Quality Management, 41 J.
WATER POLLUTION CONTROL FEDERATION 1635, 1643 (1969).
The $140,000,000 figure represents the cost of growth through 1975, 10 years short
of the 1985 time horizon employed in the DECS computations. See note 140 infra.
46 Letter from E. Smith, supra note 30.
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more satisfactorily the problem of growth in industrial loads from
existing sources. Nor does it appear that any effort was made to cure
another serious deficiency in the earlier report by considering the cost
implications of additional wasteloads imposed upon the mainstem
by dramatically increasing population and industrial concentrations
located along the Delaware tributaries.'
We are doubtful, however, that the reappraisal of costs attempted
by the remaining DECS researchers was as narrow as their written
response to the authors suggests. While the DECS has followed a
policy of secrecy which is intended to make it impossible for outside
observers to identify cost data reported by individual polluters and
observe the way in which these cost estimates have changed over time,
it has nevertheless proved possible for us to do so through a complex
series of inferences from public documents.4" As a result of this
analysis, we have concluded that the cost estimates of no more than
fourteen municipalities and four industries have changed between
1966 and 1970. Moreover, it is difficult to understand how these rela-
tively small changes could possibly have accounted for such a large
increase in the costs of dealing with growth. It appears more likely
that the new $140 million figure includes, in addition to the growth
in particular municipal sources cited by the DECS staff, some rough
overall estimate of the costs of treating waste produced by regional
growth and not assigned to particular polluters.
49
All the imprecisions and gaps in these more recent costs estimates
ultimately may be traced to a single source: neither the FWQA nor
the DRBC had any real interest in a continuing effort to ascertain the
costs of complying with the ambitious program selected for the
Delaware River. Without resources provided by either of these
agencies, three busy men working only intermittently upon the problem
47 See note 20 supra.
48 See Appendix A, inira.
49 A very rough estimate could have been obtained by estimating the total increase
in load from regional projections of population and industrial growth and then using a
standard sanitary engineering text to estimate the cost of building a secondary treatment
plant capable of handling such a load. A more conceptually correct method would have,
first, assigned the increased load to the various river sections on the basis of regional pro-
jections and information about the availability of vacant land and, second, predicted the
1975 DO profile on the assumption that none of the new load would be treated. The cost
of growth could then be calculated by estimating the cost of raising the predicted 1975
profile to the actual 1964 level, using as estimates the marginal cost data already avail-
able. Costs of higher levels of cleanliness would then be calculated upward from the per-
centage of waste removal required to maintain 1964 conditions. The most serious problem
with this method is that in practice the marginal costs of different levels of treatment
will change as raw loads change.
A third possibility is perhaps the most sensible. Since the bulk of the growth will
occur along the tributaries, the detailed population and employment projections of the
DVRPC could be used to predict growth in each tributarial watershed; one could then
estimate the cost of building regional treatment plants at the mouth of each creek to
handle this load.
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could do little more than in fact was accomplished. °
Far more important than the imperfections of the new cost
estimates was the way in which they were used by the relevant
decisionmaking agencies, especially the DRBC. In brief, the DRBC
staff ignored the implications of the sharp increase in the cost esti-
mates; indeed, our interviews with the responsible policymakers sug-
gest that this early warning signal was never presented to the
representatives of the states and the federal government who meet each
month on the Commission.
51
The remnant of the DECS staff was not, however, willing simply
to ignore the problem posed by mushrooming compliance costs. In
1969, the FWQA prepared for release to the public a summary of the
latest DECS findings, which contained a set of cost estimates that
are even higher than the initial revisions.52 In this summary, entitled
Where Man and Water Meet, the cost of dealing with anticipated
regional growth jumps once more-from $140 million to $218 million"
-and total compliance costs are estimated at $503 million (in 1964
dollars), $233 million more than the sum proferred to the DRBC
when the governors and the Secretary made their initial decision.
Upon circulating this memo for comment to the states and the DRBC,
the FWQA learned that these new higher cost estimates were bitterly
resented by officials in these agencies precisely because they cast grave
doubt upon the wisdom of the program which they were responsible
for administering. In response to this protest, the FWQA suppressed
the document's publication and no further exploration of this pfoblem
-so far as we know-has been attempted by the agencies involved. 4
50 Two of the DECS staffers, however, did publish the results -of their more recent
investigations. Smith & Morris, supra note 45. Curiously, their account serves mainly to
justify the DRBC program: it does not make clear the limitations of the original DECS
analysis nor does it urge the reappraisal of policy in light of the new estimates. The tenor
of the article becomes less baffling, however, in light of an understandable reluctance on
the part of subordinate officials to criticize openly programs having the explicit support
of their superiors.
51 Interviews with delegates from the four states represented on the DRBC as well
as the representatives from the federal government: H. Mat Adams (N.J.), Harold
Jacobs (Del.), R. Stewart Kilborne (N.Y.), Vernon Northrup and Paul Van Wegen
(U.S.), summer 1972; Maurice K. Goddard (Pa.), Sept. 1970.
52Federal Water Pollution Control Administration, U.S. Dep't of Interior, Where
Man and Water Meet: Findings of the Delaware Estuary Comprehensive Study, Prelim-
inary Draft (undated). Since Smith & Morris, supra note 45, appeared in September 1969,
and the memo was circulated early in 1969, the two papers must have been prepared at
nearly the same time. In fact, the only major difference in the two estimates is the cost
of regional growth.
53 Ethan Smith states in his letter, supra note 30, that the "$79 million is the increase
in cost estimated by DECS due to the fact that the DRBC program now calls for nearly
90% removal whereas the DECS program called for 85% (uniform) removal. The
90% requirement is caused by the establishment of a reserve for new sources by
DRBC .... "
54 Furthermore, the final version of the DECS Report has never appeared. Several
chapters exist in draft form but the sections on the dollar values of costs and benefits
have apparently never been circulated for comment. Letter from E. Smith, supra note
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2. Independent Cost Estimates
As a part of the present study, however, we sought to gain some
sense of the probable costs of compliance by attempting to interview,
in the summer of 1970, all of the polluters whose discharges are cur-
rently being regulated by the DRBC. In each of these interviews, we
did not attempt to take the growth problem explicitly into account, but
instead simply inquired how much the polluter would have to invest
to meet the cleanup requirements set for his discharge. Because dis-
chargers typically plan ahead and build their treatment facilities
large enough to handle anticipated growth in wasteloads, however,
their responses to some indeterminate extent will reflect expected
growth." Whenever it was possible, we attempted to check the verbal
estimates presented in our interviews against estimates contained in
the written reports filed for the polluters by consultants hired to plan
the treatment projects. Whenever a discharger refused to give us
data, we used the most recent DECS estimates in our total cost calcula-
tions.
When examining our data, based principally on interviews, we
found that firms and municipalities were more confident in estimating
the capital costs of building treatment facilities and making process
changes than they. were in estimating the costs of operating the treat-
ment plants which, at the time of the interviews, had not yet been
constructed. Consequently, in making our rough estimates, we con-
centrated on capital costs and process changes. Our data indicate
that these costs, when measured in.1970 dollars, totaled some $350
million."' In order to make our estimate comparable to the DECS, we
30, reported to us in June 1971 that the Report was due for publication in the summer
of 1971, but as yet no report has appeared.
55 Naturally, they will also reflect growth that has occurred between 1964 and 1970.
50 This estimate was obtained by combining interview data and data from consul-
tants' reports with the DECS capital cost estimates for those dischargers giving no inde-
pendent estimates. The derivation of the DECS estimates is provided in Appendix A,
infra. These figures, which comprised only a small proportion of the total, were inflated
by a factor of 1.3 to represent the increase in construction cost. See R. Sm=rr & R.
EILERS, COST TO THE CONSUMER FOR COLLECTION AND TREATMENT OF WASTEWATER 23
(Fig. 6) (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Water Pollution Control Research Series
17090-07/70, 1970). Our aggregate estimate breaks down as follows:
ESTIMATED CAPITAL COSTS OF REACHING OS-II
(millions of 1970 dollars)
Philadelphia 100
Gloucester City Regional 40
Camden City Regional 38
Camden County Regional 25
Wilmington 17
Other Cities Reporting Costs 16
Firms Reporting Costs (not in Deepwater Plant) 30
Firms Included in Deepwater Plant 65
Dischargers not Reporting Costs (DECS data) 7
338
In addition to the results of interviews, these estimates rely on information from ENGI-
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assumed-like the official study-that the present value of operating
and maintenance costs would be approximately equal to investment in
capital and process changes. 57 Thus our impressionistic survey suggests
that compliance will cost roughly $700 million in the forseeable future.
This figure, however, does not take into account either the costs to be
borne by new entrants or the costs which will result if, as seems almost
certain, 58 the DRBC finds itself obliged to order more stringent cut-
backs in discharges of oxygen-demanding wastes in order to meet its
water quality goals. In short, when inflation is taken into account, 59
our estimates correspond moderately well with the last set of estimates
attempted by the DECS in Where Man and Water Meet, which was
suppressed.
C. Conclusions
The picture we have portrayed is not a happy one. The inevitable
oversimplifications required in the DECS staff's first effort at cost
analysis had the net effect of biasing estimates downward. Little effort
was made, however, to make lay decisiopmakers aware of the limita-
tions of the tentative estimates at the time of original decision. No
systematic attempt was made to institutionalize a continuing reap-
praisal of the likely economic burden of the pollution control program.
Our investigation shows, moreover, that reliance on individual initia-
tive was not sufficient to assure continuing program review. Even
though enterprising staffers were not stopped completely by lack of
resources, they were discouraged from pointed exposition of their
findings by their subordinate positions within the agency."0 Finally,
even when certain staffers did attempt to raise the cost question, the
agencies concerned simply dug their heads into the sand. Internal
reports were ignored or suppressed, as in the case of Where Man and
Water Meet.
NEERING-ScIENCE, INC., DEEPWATER REGIONAL SEWERAGE SYSTEM: PRELIMINARY ENGI-
NEERING AND FEAsIBIITY STUDY, FINAL REPORT (1970) (prepared for DREC) [herein-
after cited as DEEPwATER REPORT]; JOHN G. REuTT AssocIATEs, GLOUCESTER COUNTY
REGIONAL SEWAGE TREATMENT FEASIBILITY STUDY (1967) (prepared for Gloucester
County Bd. of Freeholders); JoBsN G. REUTTER ASSOCIATES, REGIONAL SEWERAGE FEASI-
BILITY STUDY (1967) (prepared for Camden County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders).
The estimate includes the cost of constructing the large plant at Deepwater, NJ.,
which was intended to service a substantial number of industrial dischargers in that
state. See B. ACKERMAN, supra note 7, ch. 19. Since this plant will apparently not be
built, the actual costs of separate compliance can be expected to be higher for these
plants than our estimates suggest. DEEPWATER REPORT, supra, (Table XIII-3), lists
$79,000,000 as the total cost of onsite treatment. Using this figure instead of $65,000,000
yields a total of $352,000,000.
57 Thus, for the purpose of comparison we assumed the same discount rate and 20-
year life assumed by the DECS. These DECS assumptions, however, can be criticized on
several grounds. See notes 140-45 infra & accompanying text.
58 See notes 159-75 infra & accompanying text.
59 The gross national product deflator rose by almost 25% between 1964 and 1970,
but the E.H. Boeth index of the cost of constructing commercial and factory buildings
in 20 cities including Philadelphia rose by over 40% in the same period.
60 See note 50 supra.
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This unfortunate pattern suggests the need for a more explicit
institutional structure to assure the continuous study and regular
public reappraisal of the economic dimensions of important govern-
mental programs. Since a satisfactory treatment of this issue would
overly lengthen this Article, however, we have deferred its detailed
consideration to our forthcoming book-length study."
III. COUNTING THE BENEFITS
After assessing program costs, the decisionmaker must, of course,
seek to understand the extent to which each proposed cleanup program
would benefit the citizens of the Delaware Valley, as well as residents
of other regions. While recognizing that certain benefits could not be
readily translated into dollar terms, 62 the DECS nevertheless attempted
to assist policymakers by placing dollar values upon the principal
recreational and commercial uses which a cleaner Delaware would
make possible.63 Since more than ninety-five percent of these benefits
were found to reside in the river's increased potential for recreation,
we shall concentrate upon the values of these uses in the text.64 The
61 See B. AcTORmA, supra note 7, chs. 5, 10. For a preliminary effort, see Ackerman
& Sawyer, supra note 1, at 489-95.
62 See DECS, supra note 4, at 71, 74, 80. The unquantifiable benefits mentioned in
the Report include the preservation of fish and wildlife, improved drinking water taste
and aesthetics.
63 The DECS itself estimated the money value of benefits which it believed would
accrue to municipal and industrial users and to commercial fishermen. For estimates of
the benefits generated by enhanced recreational opportunities, the DECS relied heavily
on INSTITUTE FOR ENVIRONM:ENTAL STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, WATER ORI-
ENTED RECREATION BENEFITS, A STUDY OF THE RECREATION BENEFITS DERIVABLE FROM
VARIOUS LEVELS OF WATER QUALITY OF THE DELAWARE RIVER, PHASE I (1966) & PHASE
II (1967) [hereinafter cited as IES STUDY]. The study was directed by Anthony R.
Tomazinis and Iskandar Gabbour and performed for the DECS under a contract with
the Public Health Service, U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare. For con-
venience in exposition we will refer to the IES recreation benefits estimates as "DECS esti-
mates"; the designation is not unwarranted since the DECS did make use of the IES
results, thereby implicitly endorsing them.
The DECS Report was completed in 1966, but the IES Study was not completed
until 1967. The recreation-benefits estimates in the Report are based on a preliminary
version of the IES estimates. Since the completion of the final version of the IES Study,
the DECS staff have used the IES estimates in their further analyses of recreation bene-
fits. See, e.g., Smith & Morris, supra note 45, at 1635.
64The DECS estimates for each category of benefits, over and above the benefits
associated with maintaining 1964 conditions, are presented in the following table:
PRESENT VALUE OF ALL NET QUANTIFIABLE
BENEFITS IN MILLIONS OF 1964 DOLLARS
Type of Commercial
Program Estimate Recreation Fishing Industrial Total
I Maximum 355 12 -15 350
Minimum 155 9 160
II Maximum 320 12 -13 320
Minimum 135 9 140
III Maximum 310 7 -10 310
Minimum 125 5 130
IV Maximum 280 5 - 7 280
Minimum 115 3 120
DECS, supra note 4, at 77 (Table 20) (recreation benefits), 80 (Table 21) (commercial
fishing benefits), 74 (Fig. 43) (industrial benefits), 81 (total benefits).
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dollar values the DECS placed upon enhanced swimming, fishing and
boating possibilities are shown in the preceding footnote. Table 2 sum-
marizes the additional benefits which the DECS believed would be
generated by choosing a given level of pollution control rather than
the next lower objective.
TABLE 2
MARGINAL BENEFITS OF DECS POLLUTION CONTROL PLANS
(PRESENT VALUE, 1964 DOLLARS DISCOUNTED AT 3%
FOR TWENTY YEARS)
Net Marginal Benefits of
Choosing Given Objective
Instead of Next Lower
Objective Objective
Maximum Minimum
I $35 million $20 million
II 10 10
III 30 10
IV 280 115
A quick glance at the chart should at once place the conscientious.
decisionmaker on his guard. The figures reveal a puzzling pattern;
they suggest that a modest improvement in river quality will generate
relatively large benefits ($115 million if one is a pessimist, $280 million
if one is an optimist), whereas far more ambitious programs will gen-
erate only relatively small additional benefits to the citizens of the
valley. The exceedingly expensive Program I, for instance, is expected
The negative numbers in the "Industrial" column reflect the DECS staff's discovery,
id. 72, that cleaner water would actually impose costs on industrial users "primarily
due to increased corrosion rates at the higher oxygen levels." The staff does not explain
why the sums of the individual benefits categories do not equal the total benefits figures
for any of the programs.
The differences between maximum and minimum net benefit figures are detailed at
id. 76. The maximum benefit estimates assume that no swimming occurs at present, that
boats contain an average of 4 people and that 25% of all recreationists value their experi-
ence at $5 per activity day with the remainder valuing the experience at $1.25. The mini-
mum estimates assume that swimming presently occurs in the lower estuary, that each
boat averages 3.5 people, and that 25% of the users value their experience at $3 per
activity day with 75% valuing an activity day at $.75. IES STuDy, PASE II, supra note
63, at 44-56, also reports maximum and minimum estimates of net benefits. These esti-
mates are based on assumptions different from those underlying the DECS estimates. In
particular, in the IES work both maximum and minimum estimates are based on the
assumptions that swimming could take place in the lower estuary under 1964 conditions
and that boats used on the estuary carry an average of 4 people. Also, the assumptions
regarding the valuation of activity days are different and somewhat more complicated.
The DECS staff has adopted the assumptions from the IES Study for use in its subse-
quent analyses of recreation benefits.
DECS discusses the benefits data as if only swimming, boating and fishing benefits
were included. However, the discrepancies between the IES estimates for these categories
and the DECS figures indicate that the DECS data may include the dollar value of pic-
nicking benefits as well. For a fuller discussion of picnicking, see Appendix B, infra.
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to produce benefits valued at only $40 million (or $75 million if one is
an optimist) more than those anticipated from the far less costly
Program IV.
Such a dramatic decline in the returns from additional expenditure
on pollution control is not, of course, impossible. Nevertheless, the
prediction should be enough to invite the decisionmaker to probe
further: is the DECS wrong in belittling the extra benefits to be gained
from far more expensive programs? Alternatively, could the DECS
be wrong in placing a high valuation on the improvements resulting
from moving beyond the modest objective of maintaining the environ-
mental status quo? In the succeeding sections, we shall demonstrate
that the DECS committed the second error and grossly overstated the
dollar value of benefits to be gained from cleaning up the river both
under Program IV and under more ambitious proposals. Since the
methodology which generated these overestimates is in general use, 5
we shall take care to expose its basic conceptual flaws as well as the
serious errors in execution which marred the DECS effort.
The thrust of our criticism is simply that the benefit analysis
pursued along the Delaware (and elsewhere) bears little relationship
to the analysis which is suggested by relatively straightforward eco-
nomic reasoning and that, as a result, the DECS obscured rather than
clarified the nature of the policy choices to be made by the DRBC.
In stating these criticisms, we do not suggest that competent economic
analysis permits the decisionmaker" to reach a single "correct" answer
to the problem of evaluating benefits. Indeed, after our exposition of
the economist's approach is completed, we shall attempt to elaborate
upon its fundamental limitations.6 Our point here is quite modest: as
classical forms of economic reasoning can illuminate certain dimen-
sions of the pollution problem, an approach which ignores the econ-
omist's insights is at least as defective as one which looks to the dismal
science as the exclusive repository of public policy.
6uThe basic conceptual framework of the IES Study upon which the DECS esti-
mates are based is the same as the one employed by the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation,
U.S. Department of Interior, in many of its studies. For a discussion of some variants of
the basic framework and a list of the studies to which they were applied, see 3 BUREAU
OF OUTDOOR RECREATION, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, CHESAPEAxE BAY STUDY, RECREATION
ELEMENT, PLANNING AID REPORT No. 1, at 99-117 (undated). A relatively recent applica-
tion of this framework is BUREAU OF OUTDOOR RECREATION, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, A
FEASIBILITY REPORT ON THE RECREATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE PROPOSED ENGLISH RIDGE
UNIT EEL RIVER DIvIsION NORTH COAST PROJECT, MENDOCINO AND LAKE COUNTIES, CAL-
iFORNTA (1968). For a study performed by researchers outside the Bureau of Outdoor
Recreation which uses the same basic framework, see EDWARDS & KELCEY, INC., NEW
JERSEY COMPREHENSIVE OUTDOOR RECREATION PLAN (1970) & Technical Report Nos. 7-9.
A succinct summary of the basic steps used in applying the framework is given in H.
GRUBB & J. GOODWIN, ECONOMIC EVALUATION OF WATER ORIENTED RECREATION IN THE
PRELImINARY TEXAS WATER PLAN, REPORT No. 84, at 6 (1968).
66 Section V, infra.
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A. A Conceptual Framework
Before considering the particular difficulties involved in valuing
the benefits of pollution control, let us consider the more general
problem. Suppose that the results of a government-financed research
effort, when made public, led to the introduction of a new product,
say automatic washing machines, which produced better results than
the prior technology, say, hand washing. Imagine that an economist
were asked to measure the benefits generated by the research effort so
that they could be compared with its costs. How would he go about
this task?
If the washing machine market is in equilibrium at $100, the
number of machines demanded by consumers is just equal to the
number producers find it profitable to supply. At a slightly higher price
(say $101), some "marginal" consumers will balk at the offer of a
washer and choose another set of competing goods instead. For these
marginal purchasers, buying a washing machine at $100 provides them
with virtually no more satisfaction than they would have if washing
machines were not offered on the market at all. Thus, if we wish to
estimate the net benefits generated by the new technology, we must
consider exclusively the situation of those "intramarginal" consumers
(often the great majority) who would stick to washing machines even
if the price were significantly higher than $100.
Suppose, for example, we interviewed an intramarginal consumer
named Jones and learned that he would have purchased his machine
even if the price had been $150.67 Since the market only requires Jones
to pay $100, he could sacrifice $50 and still be no worse off than he
was before washing machines became available.68 If we do not exact
67 We assume that Jones will tell the truth. It is easy to see why he might not. If
Jones knew that he would have to pay the amount he quotes, he might understate his
willingness to pay. On the other hand, if he thought that his reply might affect the deci-
sion of a public authority to subsidize washing machine production, he might overstate
the maximum price he would pay. For further discussion of the problems of relying on
interviews with consumers, see text preceding note 71 infra.
68 This "sacrifice test" is better known to economists as the "compensation test,"
and the sacrifice measure of benefits is called the "compensating variation."
Unfortunately, the attempt to place a dollar value on the improvement in consumers'
positions brought about by some change in their opportunities is confronted with a
fundamental ambiguity except under very special circumstances. While the conceptual
experiment we have called the sacrifice test seems to be a reasonable one, another equally
reasonable experiment can be devised. We might ask consumers how much of a bribe
they would demand before they would consider themselves as well off without washing
machines as they are with their original money incomes and the availability of washing
machines at $100. Economists have dubbed the results of this "bribe test" the "equili-
brating variation." The sacrifices (compensating variations) consumers would make in
order to buy washing machines for $100 are equal to the bribes (equilibrating variations)
they would accept in return for forgoing this opportunity only under the quite stringent
assumption that purchases of the good under consideration do not change when all prices
are held constant and money income is increased. For a proof of this assertion, see Patin-
kin, Demand Curves and Consumer's Surplus, in MEAsUREmmNT r EcoNoMics: STUDIES
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this $50 sacrifice from Jones, the introduction of the new good has in
effect put $50 in extra income into Jones' pocket. It is this "consumer's
surplus" of $50 which the economist counts as the benefit to Jones of
his obtaining a washing machine, not the $100 market price. The total
benefit accruing from the new opportunity is obtained simply by
summing the amount of money beyond the market price each intra-
marginal consumer would sacrifice" before he forsook his washing
machine.
70
3N MATnE.ATIcAL EcoNoMIcs AND EcoNoaTRics Inf MEMORY OF YEHIUDA GRuNFED
83, 94 (C. Christ ed. 1963).
Although some authorities have argued that it will be clear from the situation under
consideration whether the sacrifice test or the bribe test is appropriate, e.g., id. 95, there
seem to be no purely logical grounds for choosing between the two tests. This funda-
mental ambiguity involved in the measurement of the benefits to consumers from changes
in their opportunities has practical implications. The benefits from a proposed change
must be compared to the costs of achieving the change. If both the sacrifice test and the
bribe test yield benefits estimates which are larger or smaller than the costs of the change
there is no problem, but if one measure of benefits exceeds costs and the other falls
short of them, the decisionmaker is faced with a dilemma which seems insoluble in prin-
dple. Our analysis will suggest, however, that this potentially troublesome ambiguity
does not cause a problem in evaluating the proposed pollution control schemes for the
Delaware Estuary, since the costs of the DRBC program quite clearly outweigh the
benefits, however defined.
69 The figure obtained by the application of the sacrifice test to the information sup-
plied by Jones and his fellow intramarginal consumers is a completely accurate measure
of the benefits to society of government research on washing machine technology only
under a set of stringent assumptions. First, it must be assumed that all goods and factor
markets are perfectly competitive and that there are no taxes or subsidies associated
with the consumption or production of any good or the use of any factor. Second, there
must be no external effects in either consumption or production; that is, the satisfaction
derived by each consumer from a given bundle of goods must be independent of how
much other consumers purchase, and the level of output of each good associated with a
given factor input must be independent of the level of output of all other goods. Third,
it must be true that the prices of all goods except washing machines and the prices of all
factors of production remain unchanged when some factors of production are switched
from the production of all other goods to the production of washing machines. The as-
sumption of constant prices is a useful first approximation when the production of the
good being considered (washing machines) makes relatively limited demands on the re-
sources available to the economy and when production does not require specialized fac-
tors of production with few alternative uses. Fourth, it must be assumed that washing
machines can be produced at a constant cost of $100 per machine over the relevant range.
Finally, decisionmakers must be convinced that a dollar's worth of sacrifice means the
same thing to society no matter which consumer makes it.
For a discussion of the problems encountered when these restrictions are relaxed and
a pessimistic conclusion regarding the usefulness of the sacrifice test, see I. LsrE, A
CRiTiQUE op WELPARE EcoNoMacs 174-84 (1957). For a discussion of how to deal with
some of these problems and a defense of the usefulness of the sacrifice test, see Har-
berger, Three Basic Postulates for Applied Welfare Economics: An Interpretive Essay,
9 J. EcoN. LIT. 785 (1971). Some economists argue that the restrictive assumptions and
information inputs required for a completely correct application of the sacrifice test under
more general circumstances are so many and so complex that they cannot even be closely
approximated in a practical application. But at the same time even many purists would
agree that when the costs of a project far exceed its benefits, or vice versa, cost-benefit
analysis remains a valuable tool, even though both costs and benefits have been obtained
by an application of the sacrifice test to a situation which does not meet many of the
restrictions which are required in principle. We shall argue that the Delaware represents
just such a case.
70jones and his fellow consumers will probably each purchase only one washing
machine. Applying the sacrifice test to the more usual case, in which the number of units
of a good purchased by each consumer continues to increase as the price of the good falls
when all other prices and money incomes are held constant, involves no new principles.
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While we are not interested in washing machines, assessing pollu-
tion control benefits leads us to ask the same basic questions. Since
pollution control provides improved opportunities for recreation, we
must ask in this case: how much money would recreationists sacrifice
before they became indifferent to the choice between their improved
set of opportunities and the old set previously available to them? Once
again, this question cannot be answered simply by ascertaining how
much money people will in fact spend in order to take advantage of
the better swimming, fishing and boating opportunities made available
by different levels of Delaware cleanup. Our first concern remains
with the consumer's surplus obtained by the intramarginal recreationist
who avails himself of the improved opportunities.
If the effect of pollution control is really to make available a
"new" good, our earlier discussion of washing machines provides us
with a sense of direction but does not provide much help with the
difficult task of trying to gain a sense of the magnitude of the con-
sumer's surplus generated by pollution control. In applying the "sacri-
fice test," we imagined that satisfactory answers could be obtained by
interviewing intramarginal consumers. But there are serious difficulties
with this technique. Not only would the procedure be costly, but the
answers received could well prove to be extremely unreliable indi-
cators of the sacrifice consumers would in fact make: consumers are
unused to speculating seriously about their potential responses to
hypothetical events such as the availability of swimming in the
Delaware. Similarly, while elaborate statistical analyses could in
principle be developed which might give better information than con-
sumer surveys, neither the state of the art nor the existing data base
for the Delaware Valley is adequate for such an effort. 71 In sum, an
economist who is attempting to be helpful to decisionmakers by placing
a money value on "new" goods cannot at the present time take refuge
in an expert manipulation of complex data, but must rely instead on a
more informal approach which is nevertheless consistent with the basic
principles we have discussed.
In order to understand how the analyst can gain a rough estimate
of the increase in consumer's surplus without the use of the elaborate
factfinding apparatus just described, it is -once again most helpful to
However, the use of market data to determine the amount that consumers are willing to
sacrifice requires somewhat greater care in this case.
71 A second cost-benefit study of pollution control on the Delaware Estuary, David-
son, Adams & Seneca, The Social Value of Water Recreational Facilities Resulting from
an Improvement in Water Quality, in WATER RESEARCH: 175 (A. Kneese & S. Smith eds.
1966), used more sophisticated statistical techniques for estimating recreational demand
than the DECS Report and the IES Study. However, this study did not attempt to ap-
ply the sacrifice test to measure benefits.
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explore another simple example. Rather than consider the introduction
of a new product (like washing machines), consider this time the
problem posed when a technological improvement simply makes it
cheaper to supply an already existing good. Imagine, for instance, that
paperback books formerly available for $2.50 are now reduced in price
to $2.00. Given this hypothetical situation, how can the economist
determine consumer's surplus by estimating in a commonsense way the
amount consumers will sacrifice before they are no worse off than in
the old situation in which paperbacks cost $2.50?
To make the problem simple, imagine further that the economist
is told that at the old price, 2 million books were sold annually while
at the new lower price 2.4 million books are purchased.72 Given this
fact, it is a straightforward matter to get a lower limit on the dollar
amount consumers would be willing to sacrifice. For we know from
history that 2 million books were purchased at $2.50; thus, the
purchasers of these books will save 500 a book under the new regime,
and could be required to sacrifice one million dollars without consider-
ing themselves any worse off.
To see that one million dollars is indeed a lower limit on the
.benefit estimate, it is necessary to turn our attention to the extra
400,000 books which by hypothesis are purchased at the lower $2.00
price. It is reasonable to suppose that some consumer's surplus will
accrue to the purchasers of these volumes, although the precise magni-
tude of this quantity is a good deal more difficult to determine. It is
possible, however, to get a first approximation. To do this, we must
take into account the fact that these books would not (by hypothesis)
have been purchased at $2.50. This means that if we required the
consumers of these volumes to sacrifice a total of $200,000 (500 x
400,000 books), they would consider themselves worse off than they
had been under the old regime. Thus, the consumer's surplus associ-
ated with the purchase of the extra 400,000 paperbacks must be
between $200,000 and zero.
In order to be more exact than this, it would be necessary to
know the number .of books which would be purchased at each price
between $2.50 and $2.00. Even in the absence of this information, how-
ever, it is possible for the analyst to say something meaningful and
relatively precise about the size of the benefit consumers as a class will
obtain in our simple example, without resort to any elaborate ap-
paratus. The money benefit of the decline in price to paperback
purchasers is between $1 million and $1.2 million per year.73
72
NVe assume that the assumptions in note 69 supra are met.
73 A significant oversimplification in the discussion in the text should be noted. Even
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Having explored the economics of one form of recreation (reading
paperbacks), we can consider whether anything has been learned about
other forms of recreation, like swimming, boating and fishing in the
Delaware River. If investment in pollution control can be viewed
simply as a means of reducing the cost consumers must incur in order
to engage in already-existing recreational activities, then our paper-
back example suggests a simple methodology. Thus, if pollution control
permits consumers to travel to a nearby swimming beach at a cost of
$2.00 instead of to an otherwise identical beach further away for
$2.50, calculating the consumer's surplus resulting from the pollution
program should be just as easy in principle as in the paperback book
example. If, however, pollution control generates services which are
perceived to be substantially different in quality so that they may more
appropriately be regarded as "new goods," it will be necessary to
employ heavier doses of subjective judgment and intuition in estimating
the amount of money consumers will be willing to sacrifice and still
be no worse off. For here the paradigm case is represented by our
discussion of washing machines rather than paperbacks.
The appropriate paradigm for an economic analysis of the benefits
of pollution control cannot, of course, be determined a priori. Environ-
mental improvement may generate "new" products or it may simply
reduce the cost of obtaining "old" ones, or it may do both. Never-
theless, our theoretical examination has prepared us to apply the
paradigms sensitively in the analysis of concrete cases, to which we
shall now turn.
B. Applying the Framework to the Pollution Problem in the Delaware
1. Swimming in the Delaware?
Consider the swimming opportunities presently available to a
resident of center-city Philadelphia. Close to home, he may pay an
admission fee and swim in the pool of his choice, either public or
private.74 At a greater distance, he has four options: he may drive
if we take $1,000,000 away from consumers they will still be better off than before the
price decline for paperback books, since they can substitute increased purchases of rela-
tively cheaper paperback books for other goods. In short, the text considers a hypo-
thetical ordinary demand curve for paperbacks which could be constructed from a market
study by varying the price of paperbacks while holding other prices and money incomes
constant, and suggests that if we knew the quantities purchased between $2.50 and $2.00
we could give a more exact estimate of the amount consumers would be willing to sac-
rifice. The area under the ordinary demand curve between the two prices is, however, a
completely accurate measure of this amount of sacrifice only in the unlikely case in
which purchases of paperbacks do not change when money incomes rise with all prices
held constant. When the quantity purchased rises with money incomes, this area is an
overestimate. The best estimate one could make from market data in this more common
case would be to determine the area between the two prices under what is called a "real
income compensated demand curve." For a full discussion of this point, see Patinkin,
supra note 68.
74 IES STUDY, PHASE I, supra note 63, at 26, reports that there were 826 public and
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between an hour and an hour and a half75 and sample the delights of
Atlantic City, or some less crowded beach at a somewhat greater dis-
tance on the Jersey Shore; he may visit one of the mountain lakes
between two and one-half and three and a quarter hours away in the
Pocono mountains; 6 he may drive southwest for two and a quarter
hours to the relatively deserted shores of the Delaware Bay, which lies
at the mouth of the Delaware River;77 he may drive for an hour or
two to the relatively small number of public swimming facilities along
the Delaware River above Trenton.78 How then will adopting one of
the competing cleanup programs broaden these options?
The answer is extremely disappointing. Even if one accepts com-
pletely the DECS predictions as to the physical consequences of
abating pollution on the Delaware, swimming and other water con-
tact recreation will be impossible under any of the proposed programs
(including the most expensive Program I) in the industrialized area
stretching from just inside the northeast city limit of Philadelphia to
just below Wilmington.79 Moreover, as an earlier Article argued in
detail, there is every reason to believe that these DECS estimates are
overly optimistic."0 Thus, it is extremely doubtful that swimming would
be possible, even under Program I, anywhere in the estuary except
perhaps in the relatively unpopulated area below Wilmington near the
Delaware Bay. In any event Program I was never seriously considered,
and the potential for swimming between Trenton and Philadelphia
under less ambitious cleanup projects is even more speculative. While
the DECS continues to predict swimming in this region under either
Program II or III,81 this prediction seems a fond hope rather than a
private pools in the 5 Pennsylvania counties (Bucks, Chester, Delaware, Montgomery
and Philadelphia) in and around Philadelphia in 1965. This estimate is based on the
number of pool permits as determined from the files of the Pennsylvania Department of
Health, Regional Office VII, in Philadelphia. The private pools included in the estimate
are those at YMCA's, country clubs, motels and similar semipublic locations. Backyard
pools are not included.
75 We estimate that the travel times to Atlantic City, Cape May and Tom's River
are 65 minutes, 85 minutes and 90 minutes respectively. This calculation was made by
measuring the distance to these locations along established routes and assuming an aver-
age speed of 60 miles per hour on expressways and 30 miles per hour on all other roads.
Our estimates are probably best interpreted as referring to an average weekday. The ex-
perience of two of the authors, Bruce and Susan Ackerman, indicates that at peak times
on summer weekends the trip to Atlantic City takes between 1 and 2 hours.
76 Using the method described in note 75 supra, we estimate that the driving time
to Mount Pocono is 155 minutes and that the driving time to Lake Wallenpaupack is
195 minutes.
77The approach outlined in note 75 supra yields an estimate of 135 minutes driving
time to Woodland Beach, located on the Delaware Bay 5 miles below the boundary be-
tween the bay and the estuary.
7 8 Using the approach outlined in note 75 supra, we estimate that it takes 125 min-
utes to drive to the Delaware Water Gap.
79 DECS, supra note 4, at 55. This area is represented by sections 7-22 in Fig. 2
accompanying note 11 supra.
80 See Ackerman & Sawyer, supra note 1, at 449-81.
81 DECS, supra note 4, at 55, shows river sections 1-4 to be suitable for water con-
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probable outcome, given Trenton's sewer problem and the significant
runoff from diffuse sources in a heavily populated area. Otherwise, the
DECS more realistically predicts that water contact recreation will be
likely only at the bottom of the estuary under Program II, III or IV.2
It should be clear, however, that making swimming possible in
the lower estuary near the Delaware Bay broadens only slightly the
range of choice open to the resident of center-city Philadelphia. But
we can be more precise than that. In order to assess the amount a
typical citizen of Philadelphia would sacrifice to swim in the lower
estuary near the Delaware Bay, we must determine whether the prob-
lem is amenable to the relatively easy approach suggested by our
discussion of the paperback books or whether it involves the difficulties
suggested by our study of washing machines. The critical difference
between the two paradigms, it should be recalled, is whether the good
evaluated is so different in quality from those previously available
that it must be considered a "new" good for purposes of benefit
analysis. In considering the issue of relative quality, we should first
inquire whether any existing resources provide a swimming experience
similar to that offered by the lower estuary. The Delaware Bay is an
obvious candidate. Indeed, the place where the estuary ends and the
bay begins is not apparent to the would-be swimmer, but instead is
defined scientifically on the basis of salt concentration. It is possible,
of course, that even though the natural character of the two areas is
identical, the manmade environments are substantially different. Most
importantly, if the bay's swimming areas were crowded and it were
impossible or ecologically undesirable to expand these facilities, making
the lower estuary available would generate benefits for those intra-
marginal users of the bay area who very much dislike crowding.
Moreover, more consumers might choose bay-estuary swimming if
crowding were noticeably reduced. The bay's swimming potential,
however, is far from exhausted, given its vast shoreline and the low
population density of the surrounding area.83 Clearly, the effect of
pollution control on the Delaware is simply to bring an already
existing type of swimming opportunity somewhat closer to the center-
city Philadelphian. For swimmers, then, cleaning up the Delaware
River is equivalent to building a better highway to the Delaware Bay
tact recreation under Programs II and III. This river segment begins opposite the middle
of Trenton and ends opposite the middle of Burlington.
82 DECS, supra note 4, at 55, shows river sections 27-30 to be suitable for water
contact recreation under Programs II, III, and IV. Section 27 begins about 10 miles be-
low Wilmington, and section 30 ends at the beginning of the Delaware Bay.
83 A telephone interview with R. Howell, Delaware Division of Public Health, Sept.
1972, confirmed that there is excess capacity at the Delaware beaches with acceptable
water quality on the Delaware Bay. On the New Jersey side of the bay there are vir-
tually no developed recreational facilities because the region is remote from population
centers and relatively inaccessible.
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with a consequent reduction in travel time and expense. It is properly
comprehended under the paperback book paradigm as a cheaper form
of a good already on the market.
Proceeding on our analysis of that simple hypothetical, we note
first that those already traveling to the bay for swimming would
sacrifice a sum equal to their saving in travel costs 4 times the number
of trips they were already making. For those new trips induced by
the bay-estuary area's new proximity, the analysis is somewhat less
conclusive. Nevertheless, it should be clear that each new traveler,
like each new purchaser of books in the paradigm case, will obtain
less intramarginal surplus than any of the old bay swimmers who
now use the new facilities, because they formerly did not value bay-
estuary type swimming sufficiently to make the trip to the bay. Thus,
the total money benefit resulting from the new trips will be obtained
by multiplying a number which is less than the travel cost saving (but
greater than zero) by the number of new trips taken.85
84 Travel cost includes the price of a mass transit ticket or the gas, oil and deprecia-
tion by use costs of traveling by automobile plus a valuation of the traveler's time. If
the trip is a long one, meal and lodging costs above those that would be incurred if the
swimmer stayed home should also be included.
Several studies have employed estimates of travel cost. See, e.g., H. GRUBB & J.
GOODWI, supra note 65; Knetsch & Davis, Comparisons of Methods for Recreation
Evaluation, in WATER RESEARCH, supra note 71, at 138-42. These studies do not attempt
to value the time spent traveling and assume that travel cost is simply related to dis-
tance traveled, an assumption which may not be justified if some roads are quite con-
gested. For a recent attempt to deal with the problems of valuing travel time, see R.
GRONAU, THE VALUE OF Tim IN PASSENGER TRANSPORTATION: THE DEMAND FOR Am
TRAVEL (1970). A good summary of similar attempts is Nelson, The Value of Travel
Time, in PROBLEIS IN PuBLic ExPENDITuREr ANALYsIS 78 (S. Chase ed. 1968).
85 The benefits to swimmers from pollution control can be represented by trapezoid
ABCDE in the diagram below. The rectangle ABDE represents the benefits accruing to
those already engaged in bay-estuary type swimming. The triangle BCD represents
benefits generated by new trips. The trapezoid ABCDE is a completely accurate mea-
sure of benefits only under the restrictions outlined in note 69 supra.
Travel
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There is room for dispute as to the precise number of new trips
that will be taken and the exact money savings per trip which
would result from making bay-estuary swimming available closer to
population centers, but there can be no doubt that the total benefits
resulting from the economist's calculation will be exceedingly small.
At present, the Delaware Bay attracts a relatively small share of the
millions of swimming days annually enjoyed by Philadelphians in
pools, on the Jersey Shore, the upper Delaware and the Poconos. There
is no reason to expect that improving the bay-estuary's competitive
position by making it a bit closer to the metropolis will change matters
significantly.86
2. Boating on the Delaware
The DECS estimates that on a pleasant weekend day thousands
of pleasure boats may ply the waters of the estuary in its present
"polluted" condition.87 In other words, it would be wrong to assume
(as we did in the case of swimming) that the Delaware is at present
an untapped boating resource. The question remains, however, whether
any of the pollution programs considered would so raise the quality
of the boating experience that present users of the estuary would set
an appreciably higher value on the boating experience there; that
those boatsmen now using either the Jersey Shore or the Delaware
Bay would shift in significant numbers to the estuary; 8 or that many
others would abandon their former nonboating pursuits to become
Delaware boatsmen.
If these are the questions, the answers are rather straightforward.
There is no reason to believe that any of the pollution control pro-
grams will significantly improve the quality of the boating experience
on the Delaware. "Pollution" may reduce the pleasure of boating if it
causes such substantial oxygen depletion that the water emits a
malodorous stench; 9 contains elements corrosive to hulls; or impairs
86 The DECS staff reached a different conclusion. See Section IV, infra.
87 Federal Water Quality Administration, Environmental Protection Agency, Dela-
ware Estuary Comprehensive Study, Final Report, ch. 3B, at 10 (Feb. 3, 1970) (un-
published materials on file at the Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania Law
School) [hereinafter cited as DECS Final Report, Preliminary Draft], states that "[alp-
proximately 15,000 boats use the estuary." This figure was reached "by estimating the
number of boats using the estuary from boat registration data and from estimates from
state shore patrols." IES SrY, PHAsE I, supra note 63, at 30, 32, using an undisclosed
method, estimated that 10,000 boats were in use on the estuary "on the Pennsylvania
side" in 1965 and that 3,125 boats used the northern part of the estuary "on the New
Jersey side."
88 Of course, a substantial change in quality, were it to occur, might also cause
boaters who now use lakes in the Poconos, the Chesapeake Bay or the Susquehanna
River to switch to the estuary.
89 See text following note 9 supra.
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the appearance of the river by increasing the water's turbidity." As to
the first threat, the presence of a large number of boating parties indi-
cates, and the testimony of DRBC officials confirms,91 that there is
no significant odor problem on the estuary at present and that any
program which seeks to improve oxygen levels cannot be justified on
the ground that it is necessary to eliminate this nonexistent nuisance.
As to the second risk, there is little evidence that the extra corrosion
due to pollution generates costs of any considerable magnitude.92 The
third problem, dealing with visual aesthetics, is more complex. Al-
though the Delaware is at present an extremely turbid river, none
of the proposed programs is likely to transform the situation sub-
stantially since the river's cloudiness is explained in large part by
tides stirring up the river bottom, dredging operations required for
large-scale shipping, and the introduction of sediment from the
riverbanks and tributaries. 93 Even if turbidity is somewhat reduced,
this "quality improvement" may not be an unmixed blessing to the
boatsman, because by making it possible for sunlight to penetrate
farther below the surface, turbidity reductioli will greatly encourage
photosynthetic activity by algae. Thus, "solving" the turbidity problem
may create a more serious problem; boaters may be greeted by green
scum, which upon the algae's death will be transformed into a stinking
mass of decomposing matter.94
Assuming, however, that turbidity will be reduced, it would be
easy to overestimate the impact of this improvement on the totality of
the boating experience. If one were to take a day trip down the
Delaware through the highly urbanized area between Trenton and
Wilmington, one would hardly notice the slight change in water color
wrought by pollution control. For the river is the scene of far more
arresting activities: major industrial complexes dominate the shoreline,
large tankers steam by, and a host of other activities on river and
9 0 "Pollution" may also take the form of oil slicks, which are both a nuisance and a
danger to boaters. Although they may well be a more important problem for boaters
than any of the other problems mentioned in the text, oil slicks were not a major con-
cern of the DECS. The DECS forecast that there would be some reduction in the amount
of oil and grease in the estuary as a byproduct of treatment procedures at industrial and
municipal sources designed primarily to raise the DO level. Oil slicks due to spills at re-
fineries are a somewhat different problem. The DECS did not include the expense of
cleaning up these spills in their cost estimates for any of the pollution control programs.
The DRBC has, however, begun to insist that major spills be cleaned up. The costs and
benefits of the DRBC's policing of oil spills have not been systematically investigated.
91 Note 10 supra.
92 Nowhere in DECS, supra note 4, in IES STuny, supra note 63, or in DECS Final
Report, Preliminary Draft, supra note 87, ch. 3B, is the corrosion of hulls mentioned as
a deterrent to boating activity.
93 Ackerman & Sawyer, supra note 1, at 445.
9 4 1d. 446.
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shore remind the boatsman that he is coexisting with the life of the
port which serves the fourth-largest urban complex in the United
States. This visual experience has its attractions; but to imagine that
a slight change in water color will transform this experience so as to
attract a different class of boaters searching for a more natural setting
is nonsense. These recreationists will go where they always have gone-
to the Jersey Shore, the lower estuary and the bay, and even further
to the Chesapeake and the Poconos. Thus, the benefits-as the econo-
mist sees them-from pollution control will be no greater for boating
than they were for swimming.
3. Fishing in the Delaware
We come, finally, to those activities whose perceived quality and
price will be affected appreciably by a polution control program of
the kind proposed for the Delaware. The principal purpose of each of
the DRBC's proposed programs was to raise DO levels in the estuary
by requiring municipal and industrial dischargers to reduce the emis-
sion of those pollutants which would otherwise consume oxygen in the
river as they decomposed. 5 Since fish require dissolved oxygen for
their survival, raising DO levels should permit a richer aquatic life
in a wider area than that which was formerly possible. The minimum
oxygen level required for survival is at best ill-defined and differs
according to the breed of fish considered, but if DO levels remain
generally at five ppm and rarely if ever fall below three ppm, a broad
variety of aquatic life may be expected. Purporting to apply this
standard, 6 the DECS used its mathematical model to predict the
95 The bulk of pollution control costs under each of the programs would be incurred
in order to reach the DO objective. See note 16 supra.
96 IES STUDY, PHASE II, supra note 63, at 20 n.10, states that a section is considered
suitable for high usage fishing if there is a 90-95% chance that anadromous fish (in the
case of the Delaware, primarily the American shad) can survive passage through it. This
standard is translated into DO levels by the DECS staff in A. Morris & G. Pence, Quan-
titative Estimation of Migratory Fish Survival Under Alternative Water Quality Control
Programs 6-9 (undated) (unpublished manuscript under imprint of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Administration, U.S. Dep't of Interior, Edison, N.J.) [hereinafter cited
as Morris & Pence]. The study reports that shad survive in water with DO levels of 3
ppm but die in water with DO levels of 2.5 ppm or less. Using experts' advice, the DECS
concluded that shad could survive for several minutes if the DO level fell below 3 ppm.
It then argued that if there is to be a 95% chance of shad survival in a section, the
mean DO level must be high enough to insure that DO levels will not dip below 3 ppm
more than 5% of the time.
The DECS staff's reasoning assumes that daily DO levels in each section have the
familiar bell-shaped normal distribution. Under this assumption there is a 95% chance
that the observed DO level in any section will lie within a range of 2 standard devia-
tions on either side of the mean DO level for that section. The DECS staff report that
the average standard deviation of the daily DO level for all sections in the Delaware is
approximately 1 ppm. They reason that if the mean DO level in a section on a given day
is 5 ppm, we can expect the observed DO level to lie between 3 ppm and 7 ppm 95%
of the time and to lie below 3 ppm 2.5% of the time. This reasoning leads them to the
conclusion that if the mean DO level in a section is 5 ppm on a given day, there is a
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sections which would sustain "high usage fishing" under each of the
proposed cleanup programs. Similarly, it marked those sections which
would satisfy a somewhat less demanding DO test as suitable for
"medium usage fishing."" Areas available for high and medium usage
fishing at the time of the survey (1964) were also recorded, permitting
the DECS to formulate a chart summarizing the consequences of the
four river improvement programs as well as Program V, which simply
contemplated maintaining the status quo:98
TABLE 3
DECS ESTIMATES OF DELAWARE ESTUARY SECTiONS SUITABLE
FOR HIGH AND MEDIUM USAGE FISHING
Sections Suitable for Sections Suitable for
Program High Usage Fishing Medium Usage Fishing
I 1-10, 18-30 11-17
II 1-7, 28-30 8-27
III 1-7, 28-30 8-9, 22-27
IV 1-3, 28-30 4-9, 23-27
V 1-3, 28-30 4-9, 23-27
In sketching the way an economist would assess the impact of
a DO improvement program upon fishermen, we will focus on the
availability of high usage fishing resources in the upper estuary be-
95% chance that a shad could pass through the section on that day. (Strictly there would
be a 97.5% chance of survival.)
We reported in our earlier essay, Ackerman & Sawyer, supra note 1, at 455-457, that
for most of its calculations the DECS staff used a so-called steady state assumption;
that is, they assumed that the same conditions would prevail in the river every day dur-
ing the summer. Under this assumption, if 5 ppm is the summer average DO level in a
section, it is also the daily average DO level. If there is a 95% chance that a shad could
survive passage through a section on one day during the summer, under the DECS steady
state assumption there is a 95% chance that a shad could survive passage any day dur-
ing the summer.
Under the DECS assumptions every section for which the predicted summer average
DO level is 5 ppm or more is one in which there is a 95% chance of shad survival, and
so is suitable for high usage fishing.
97None of the DECS reports we have obtained states specifically the standard which
the DECS used to determine whether or not a section was suitable for medium usage
fishing. We have argued in note 96 supra that the fragmentary evidence available sug-
gests that a section was considered suitable for high usage fishing if the predicted sum-
mer average DO leicel was 5 ppm or greater. If this inference is correct, then sections
with summer average DO levels of between 5 ppm and some lower bound were con-:
sidered suitable for medium: usage fishing. This lower bound appears to be 3.5 ppm.
DECS, supra note 4, at 55-58, shows that under Program IV, sections 23-27 have a pre-
dicted summer average DO level of 3.5 ppm, and these sections are designated as suitable
for medium usage fishing. Under Program III, sections 18-21 have a predicted summer
average DO level of 3 ppm, and these sections are not designated as suitable for medium
usage fishing. But see note 106 infra.
Sections deemed suitable for neither high nor medium usage fishing were designated
as suitable for "low usage fishing."
98 The data for this chart was derived from DECS, supra note 4, at 55 (Fig. 39).
The section numbers appearing in the table are identical to those shown on the map in
Figure 2 accompanying note 12 supra.
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tween Philadelphia and Trenton," which the DECS subdivided into
sections 1-7. Under Programs IV and V, high usage fishing is available
only in the relatively small area near Trenton in sections 1-3, con-
sisting of 28 shore miles; under Programs III and II, high usage
fishing is available in sections 1-7, enlarging the area by 32.4 shore
miles.
00
Once again, we first ask whether the quality of the fishing ex-
perience which Programs II and III promise in sections 4-7 is com-
parable to the experience which already exists in programs IV and V
in sections 1-3. As the physical characteristics of the river throughout
sections 1-7 are roughly the same, we again focus on the manmade
elements of the environment, particularly the crowding phenomenon.
If a crowding problem does exist in sections 1-3, some benefits will
accrue to those intramarginal fishermen who value solitude, since the
population of fishermen will become somewhat more diffuse when
sections 4-7 are opened up as high usage areas.1 1 Although data are
inadequate for a firm judgment, the information we do possess sug-
gests that crowding is not such a problem that a significant number of
fishermen would be willing to make a substantial sacrifice for more
seclusion."0 2 The only systematic census of estuary fishermen which has
come to our attention is one attempted by the DECS in the mid-1960's
which found that "7,960 fishermen us[ed] the estuary per day.' 03
9 9 We have limited our concern to assessing the benefits in the upper estuary be-
cause, as Table 3 indicates, the benefits of high usage fishing, however small, are far
more significant there than in the southern sections where, under all but the most ex-
pensive program, no area expansion whatsoever is contemplated for this use.
10o These measurements include the shore length of islands in sections 2 and 4. With-
out islands the shore length for sections 1-3 is 24.4 miles, and for sections 4-7 it is 28.7
miles. These shore lengths were obtained by following the shoreline with a map reader
on Coast and Geodetic Survey, Environmental Science Services Administration, U.S. Dep't
of Commerce, Map No. 295 (27th ed. 1971). The boundaries of the sections were fixed
by reference to DECS, supra note 4, at 34 (Fig. 20).
In performing our own map measurements, we discovered that the IES had seriously
mismeasured the shoreline of the estuary. For example, IES STUDY, PHAsE II, supra note
63, at 22 (Table 7), claims that the length of the shoreline of sections 1-7 and sections
28-30 is 254,700 feet. As a simple check, one can measure the length of the navigation
channel in these sections and double it to obtain a rough estimate of the length of the
shoreline. This procedure yields a result of 385,950 feet. More exact measurement accord-
ing to the method described above yields a figure of 430,300 feet excluding islands and
480,760 feet including islands. We have not been able to discover the source of the error
made by the IES.
101 Fishermen would also be attracted from other sites and other pursuits to fish in
the estuary if crowding were reduced. These fishermen would be willing to sacrifice
somewhat less for the improvement in quality than those who were already using the
estuary because they did not consider it worth their while to engage in estuary fishing
before the change.
102DECS, supra note 4, at 51.
1o3 DECS Final Report, Preliminary Draft, supra note 87, ch. 3B, at 12. The method
used in this census is not described in the draft chapters of the Final Report; nor were
we able to find out more about it from the DECS staff. It is not clear whether the
census refers to a weekday or to a weekend, whether or not an average of several sam-
ples was taken, or how the fishermen were distributed among the various sections of the
estuary.
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If 8,000 fishermen use the entire estuary, it seems highly unlikely that
more than a couple of thousand use sections 1-3; the extensive
shoreline available in these sections renders it implausible that a
substantial fraction of even this small number of fishermen would
sacrifice a considerable sum for greater seclusion, especially if it is
conceded that the fishermen who value solitude the most will not
fish in the river anyway but will seek their peace in more natural
settings farther from the metropolis.
Thus, as in the case of swimming, the paperback book paradigm
seems controlling; the principal benefit obtained by adding sections
4-7 as high usage areas can be measured by the savings in transporta-
tion time and expense accruing to fishermen in Philadelphia who will
find good fishing closer at hand. In addition, increasing the proximity
of good fishing will induce some citizens to substitute high usage estu-
ary fishing for other activities. These "new" fishermen will receive a
smaller benefit per trip than that obtained by the "old" fishermen, as
they were unwilling to pay the old travel cost in order to engage in
high quality estuary fishing. It is, of course, impossible to guess pre-
cisely how many "new" fishermen would arrive on the scene as a result
of reducing the auto time between downtown Philadelphia and the
fishing area from a minimum of thirty-six minutes to a minimum of
twenty-four minutes.' ° In light of the relatively small change in
travel time and the fact that relatively few fishermen presently use the
smaller area, it seems probable that no great number of new fishermen
will be attracted to sections 4-7.105
104 These estimates were obtained by the method described in note 75 supra. Thirty-
six minutes is the average weekday travel time to Tullytown, which is located at the
boundary of section 3 nearest Philadelphia; 24 minutes is the average weekday travel
time to the Tacony-Palmyra Bridge, which marks the boundary of section 7 nearest
Philadelphia.
105 It also appears that the benefits generated by increasing the area of medium
usage fishing will be quite small. As indicated in Table 4 accompanying note 106 infra,
Program IV generates no increase in the area available for medium usage fishing, and
Program III will bring the availability of this activity just 1 estuary section (about 2
miles) closer to Philadelphia. Programs II and I do lead to large increases in the area
available for medium usage fishing, but it would be easy to exaggerate the benefits from
these increases. The estuary is virtually inaccessible on the Pennsylvania side from sec-
tion 8 to section 15 because of the waterside development of the city of Philadelphia
and its suburbs and on the New Jersey side from section 9 to section 14 because of the
shoreline development of the city of Camden and its suburbs. On the Pennsylvania-Dela-
ware side most of sections 17-21 are inaccessible because of the cities of Chester and
Wilmington and the oil-unloading facilities at Marcus Hook. Except for section 16 and
parts of sections 17 and 21, the New Jersey side is accessible along most of this shore-
line. Furthermore, the most attractive forms of game fish need DO levels higher than
those required to meet the medium usage fishing standard. See notes 96-97 supra. Finally
to be considered is the prospect that medium usage fishing may not fully materialize in
these areas, since sections 8-22 are the ones in which periodic severe oxygen problems
due to storm water overflow are a serious threat to the survival of fish. Although it
would be very difficult to give a precise dollar estimate of the increase in benefits due to
medium usage fishing as a result of the increase in water quality projected for sections
8-21 under Programs II and I, it seems for these reasons that the benefits could not be
very substantial.
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Up to this point, our analysis compels the conclusion that in-
creasing the area of rich aquatic life will generate only extremely
modest benefits for the estuary's recreational fishermen. This con-
clusion must, however, be modified in an even more pessimistic direc-
tion once the frailties of the DECS procedure are considered. First, if
as the DECS assumed, high usage fishing is defined to include all
river sections for which the summer average DO level is five ppm and
whose likely fluctuations will depress DO to no less than three ppm, the
DECS has erred substantially in selecting the sections which satisfy
the standard under the proposed programs. When we applied the
DECS standard to its DO predictions, °6 our results diverged from
the DECS figures in the following way:
TABLE 4
COMPARISON OF ESTIMATES OF DELAWARE ESTUARY SECTIONS
SUITABLE FOR HIGH USAGE FISHING
Independent
Estimate of
DECS "High "High Usage"
Program Usage" Fishing Fishing
I 1-10, 18-30 1-10, 18-30
II 1-7, 28-30 1-7, 20-30
III 1-7, 28-30 1-7, 28-30
IV 1-3, 28-30 1-7, 28-30
V 1-3, 28-30 1-7, 28-30
If our designations are correct, no benefits at all will accrue as a
result of moving from Program V to Program III. Some benefits, how-
106 For the DECS DO predictions, see DECS, supra note 4, at 56-58 (Tables 8-12).
We find that sections 4-7 meet the 5 ppm standard under Programs IV and V, while the
DECS contends that these sections only become suitable under Program III. Our case
for Program V rests on the DECS predictions. The DECS predictions show a lower sum-
mer average DO level for sections 1-7 under Program IV than under Program V (1964
conditions). Since Program IV involves more treatment, we consider this result unlikely,
so we assume that conditions in sections 1-7 would be at least as good under Program
IV as they are under Program V. We find that sections 20-27 meet the 5 ppm standard
under Program II, whereas the DECS holds that these sections only become suitable
under Program I. Here again we rely on the DECS predictions.
Our application of what we take to be the DECS standards also requires some revi-
sions of the sections regarded as suitable for medium usage fishing by the DECS as re-
ported in Table 3. The revisions are summarized in the following table.
DECS "Medium Usage" Independent Estimate
Program Fishing of "Medium Usage" Fishing
I 11-17 11-17
II 8-27 8-27
III 8-9, 22-27 8-9, 22-27
IV 4-9, 22-27 8-9, 22-27
V 4-9, 22-27 8-9, 22-27
Sections 8 and 9 are included under Programs III and IV, and section 22 under Program
IV, because they appear to be suitable under Program V, and although the DECS predicts
that DO levels will deteriorate in these sections under programs which involve more
treatment, we consider this outcome to be unlikely.
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ever, will be generated as a result of a movement to Program II, since
high usage fishing will-it is claimed-be possible in eight additional
sections, although these benefits will be small given the proximity of
similar fishing opportunities in the bay. Moreover, we have argued
elsewhere that the DECS predictions as to the likely DO improvement
resulting from any of the control programs may well be over-optimis-
tic.107 Thus, it would be wise to recognize that achieving even this
benefit is by no means certain.
4. The Shad Problem
Up to the present point, we have spoken as if the only significant
effect rof DO improvement on fishing were its impact upon recreational
opportunities in the estuary itself. This is, however, to take too
narrow a view. The estuary serves as a vital conduit for anadromous
fish (most notably the American shad) that begin their lives in the
headwaters of the river, spend much of their adulthood in the ocean,
and return through the estuary to upriver spawning grounds to com-
plete the reproductive cycle. The shad fishery in the Delaware River
above Trenton is an important attraction for sport fishermen in New
York, Pennsylvania and New Jersey. 08
In order to understand the effect raising the DO level in the
estuary might have on the shad fishery, one must know a little more
about the life pattern of the shad.10 9 An adult Delaware shad heads
up the river from the ocean some time during an eight-week period
beginning in late March or early April and ending in middle or late
May. 10 If a shad is an early migrator, chances for a safe passage up
1
0 7 Ackerman & Sawyer, supra note 1, at 457-82.
108 There is also a relatively small commercial shad fishery on the Delaware.
The importance placed on the shad by those involved with the pollution control
decisions in the estuary evoked this summary statement and warning from the DECS
staff:
During the development of the alternative water quality programs for the estu-
ary, the passage of anadromous fish, specifically the shad Alosa sapidissima, be-
came a matter of great interest to those having to decide on which water quality
management program to select. The concern evidenced for this annual visitor to
the estuary came from many quarters. The reasons for the concern were almost
as numerous as the interests involved. Basically the interest was not .economic-
the annual value of the shad fishery is small (i.e., $20,000 commercial and
$50,000 recreation benefits). The main argument seemed to be that if the river
inhibits the shad migration, it is unacceptable to the general public.
Morris & Pence, supra note 96, at 1. The $20,000 figure is a DECS staff estimate of the
market value of the yearly commercial catch. We have been unable to learn the source
of the $50,000 figure for recreational benefits.
Almost all sport fishing for shad takes place at sites above Trenton. Telephone con-
versation with Joseph P. Miller, Coordinator, Delaware River Anadromous Fishery
Project (DRAFP), May 1972. Mr. Miller also stated that sport fishing does not have a
substantial impact on the size of the Delaware's shad population.
10 9 The description of the life pattern of the shad in the Delaware which follows is
based on NEw JERsEY BUREAU OF SPORT FIsHEams & W UDLiE, ANNUAL PROGRESS RE-
PORT, DELAWARE RIVER ANADROmOUS FIsH PROJECT (1972) thereinafter cited as 1972
ANN. REP. DRAFP]; telephone conversation with Joseph P. Miller, supra note 108.
110 The beginning of the shad run depends primarily on water temperature. For a
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the estuary to the headwaters are good; the combination of early spring
high flow and relatively low water temperature makes it likely that the
DO level in even the most polluted regions of the estuary will exceed
three ppm,"' the level below which few shad can survive for any length
of time." 2 The problem for the early migrator arises once the eggs
have been laid and fertilized. Adult shad do not normally eat in the
river during the spawning run; they attempt to return to the ocean
to feed. But by the time many of the spent or spawned-out shad have
arrived again at the estuary, reduced flow and rising temperatures,
combined with about the same discharge of waste materials as before,
have reduced DO in some sections to lethal levels. Barred by this
pollution block from the ocean, their natural feeding place, the spent
shad die of starvation."' Not many early-migrating shad travel twice
up to the headwaters of the Delaware.
The lot of the late migrator is a happier one. By the time he
begins his migration DO in some sections is low enough to prevent his
passage through the estuary. Consequently, he heads up a lower
tributary to spawn or makes his way through the Delaware and
Chesapeake Canal to the Chesapeake Bay and from there to the
Susquehanna River to fulfill his reproductive urge." 4 Since his return
route to the ocean is probably still open, a second or third spawning
trip by a late migrator is likely.
Although the offspring of late migrators probably have little
trouble in making the normal fall trip to the ocean where they will
mature, juveniles born of early migrators face the same pollution block
encountered by their unfortunate parents. Because juveniles feed in
the river, their need to return to the ocean is not. so urgent, but they
must reach the ocean to mature and so must wait until temperatures
are low enough to ensure that DO is above minimum survival levels.
Apparently juveniles enjoy reasonable success in reaching the ocean." 5
To gain a sense of the extent to which pollution control will
benefit the shad, the DECS predicted the probability of adult shad
"survival"'"" during the spring migration through the estuary under
more detailed discussion, see 1972 ANN. RFP. DRAFP, supra note 109, at 12-34; Morris
& Pence, supra note 96, at 4-6.
111 Morris & Pence, supra note 96, at 6.
112 Ackerman & Sawyer, supra note 1, at 437 n.25; note 96 supra.
113 1972 Amr. REP. DRAFP, supra note 109, at 56.
114 Id. 26-30.
115 Id. 60.
116 The DECS "survival" data relate only to the percentage of shad which could pass
through the estuary on their way upstream to spawn, see DECS, supra note 4, at 61;
Morris & Pence, supra note 96, at 4 (both using "passage" and "survival" interchange-
ably), but our discussion shows, text accompanying note 114 supra, that migrating shad
blocked from passage may well "survive."
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some of the proposed programs." 7 The DECS task was complicated
by the fact that, as we have seen, shad "survival" depends not only
upon the level of waste discharges but also upon river conditions
prevailing in a given year."18 Thus, the DECS was required to esti-
mate shad "survival" over a wide range of flow and temperature
combinations which were suggested by historical observations of the
river. The results may best be portrayed in the graphic form used by
the DECS (Figure 4). 19 The graph indicates that under river condi-
FIGURE 4
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tions likely to prevail fifty percent of the time, pollution programs II
and III will significantly increase the percentage of shad which "sur-
vive" the trip through the estuary from sixty percent under present con-
ditions (Program V) to eighty-five percent (under Program III) or
ninety-five percent (under Program II). This substantial difference
becomes even greater in the fifty percent of the years during which
river conditions accentuate the impact of waste discharges on the DO
profile. Thus under present conditions no more than forty percent of
the shad will 'survive" their springtime migration during the worst
year in every three, while only twenty percent will complete their
journey in the four. worst years in every century. In contrast, "sur-
vival" rates remain high under Programs III and II.
117 DECS, supra note 4, at 60. The DECS discussion is based on the more detailed
study by Morris & Pence, supra note 96.
118 Ackerman & Sawyer, supra note 1, at 482-84.
119 DECS, supra note 4, at 60 (Fig. 4).
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These significant improvements forecast by the DECS model
must, however, be viewed with caution for three reasons. First, the
DECS "survival" data does not in fact measure what it purports to
quantify. 2 ' As we have shown, late migrators do not, in fact, die in
the Delaware but live in the Susquehanna and elsewhere. The shad
which do die are early migrators attempting to return to the ocean,
and it is not at all clear that the DECS "survival" data can be applied
without substantial modification to this significant group. Moreover,
many of the youthful shad spawned in the Delaware simply wait until
the pollution block lifts before completing their journey to the ocean.
Second, we have argued elsewhere that the DECS projections contain
substantial elements of over-optimism; 121 if our arguments are correct,
neither Program III nor II will generate the DO improvements as-
sumed by the DECS survival estimates.
Third, the DECS predictions must be viewed against the Army
Corps of Engineers' plan for the construction of a large dam at Tocks
Island in the upper Delaware as part of a flood control program which
has the approval of the DRBC. The Tocks Island Dam, as the DECS
itself notes in an unrelated section of its report,
will probably be a hindrance to the normal migration of
shad to and from the principal spawning areas above the dam
site. Because of this obstacle, it is the general opinion of
biologists that shad spawning success will be considerably
reduced in the Delaware River.1
2 2
The DRBC's recent pronouncements are somewhat more sanguine,
but they must be balanced against conservationists' claims that Atlan-
tic shad are simply too weak to climb the proposed dam's fish ladder
and hence will die. The uncertainty surrounding the dam is com-
pounded by the success of conservationists thus far in delaying its
construction despite the DRBC's support of the project.
Until the dam's fate is determined and its impact is better under-
stood, it would seem reasonable to defer any large expenditure justified
primarily on shad-protection grounds. This wait-and-see strategy finds
support in the plain fact that a sizeable shad population is sustaining
itself under present conditions. 23 Although a further deterioration of
120 See note 116 supra.
121 Ackerman & Sawyer, supra note 1, at 457-82.
122 DECS, supra note 4, at 79.
123 Telephone interview with Joseph P. Miller, supra note 108. According to 1972
ANN. RFi. DRAFP, supra note 109, at 41, techniques used so far have not succeeded in
generating enough data for a reliable statistical estimate of the number of American shad
spawning in the upper reaches of the Delaware River. Estimates of the size of the shad
population must, therefore, be-quite impressionistic. NEw JERSEY BuREAu OF SPORT FIsHr-
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DO levels in the estuary would over time mean that no shad would
reach the upper Delaware, maintaining present conditions (as con-
templated by Program V) is a viable shortrun alternative until the
long-range prospects can be more intelligently assessed. Rather than
counsel such a strategy, however, the DECS Report ignored the dam
problem and proceeded to offer decisionmakers a determinate set of
shad "survival" probabilities, associated with each pollution program,
which had only a tangential relationship to ecological realities.
5. Conclusion
-The DECS rests its case for pollution control almost entirely
upon the benefits to be derived by swimmers, boaters and fishermen
from enhanced recreational opportunities. Yet, from an economist's
perspective, these benefits seem trivial in comparison to the costs
which we have estimated the DRBC's program will impose upon
pivate firms and government. Although we shall later consider whether
a persuasive case for pollution control can be made on grounds not
considered by conventional cost-benefit analysis, it is important at
this point to consider the fundamental reasons why the DECS esti-
mated the recreational benefits to be many times the order of magni-
tude we have suggested. For an exploration of the basic conceptual
errors in the DECS approach, which is common to many similar
efforts, 124 reveals how a quantitative approach divorced from a solid
foundation in elementary economic theory can be worse than useless,
resulting in a set of numbers which obscures the fundamental issues
at stake.
IV. THE DECS APPROACH TO BENEFIT ESTIMATION
The hallmark of the simple economist's approach we have con-
sidered thus far is its emphasis on the consumer's perspective. From
this perspective, the central fact is that the Delaware Valley consumer
already has open to him a wide range of water-based recreational
alternatives; for it is this fact that makes cleaning up the Delaware
seem of relatively small importance. Obviously, if the other recrea-
tional facilities available in the valley were less- bountiful, consumers
would be willing to sacrifice more for improved fishing and swimming
ERiEs & WILDLIFE, AmNuAL PROGRESS REPORT, DELAWARE RiVER ANADROMOUS FIsH PROJ-
ECT 17 (1970), for example, states that "there appeared to be a fair run of adult spawning
shad" in the early spring of 1969. The DECS "survival" estimates cited in the text indi-
cate that under current conditions 20% or.more of the migrating shad should reach the
headwaters of the Delaware 96% of the time.
124 See note 65 supra.
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opportunities even in those sections of the estuary relatively far from
population centers. It is this consistent effort to view pollution control
as a way of adding to an already existing set of consumer activities
which sets the economist's approach apart from that pursued by the
DECS.
A. The DECS Definition of the "Study Area"
Instead of taking a consumer's perspective, the DECS suffered
from a characteristic form of planner's myopia. After all, the planner
has been charged with the task of investigating the effects of pollution
control on the estuary; what is more natural than to isolate the
estuary in the analysis and give it more prominence than it deserves
from the consumer's perspective? For example, the analyst's first task
is to fix the boundaries of the "study area" which will be considered in
detail. Under the economist's approach, any consumer who considers
himself substantially affected by enhanced water quality in the Dela-
ware should be included in the "relevant population" of consumers.
By the same principle, the "study area" should include not only the
estuary but all those sites considered important recreational alternatives
by a substantial portion of the relevant population. 125 In contrast, the
DECS defined the "study area" to include only the population and
the alternative recreational sites located in the highly-urbanized eleven
counties nearest the estuary.'26 Under this arrangement, the fact that
residents of Trenton, Camden, Philadelphia and Wilmington might
prefer to go to the Jersey Shore, the Poconos or the Delaware Bay
could be ignored on the question-begging ground that these recreational
sites, which are by far the most popular ones, were outside the "study
area."' 27 Thus it seemed as if the residents of the eleven urbanized
counties who ventured outside the "study area" were being required to
125 Of course, judgment must be used in giving empirical content to the general
concepts of the "relevant population" and the "recreational alternatives considered im-
portant by a substantial portion of the population." It is usually not practical to include
every user or potential user in the relevant population, or to account for people who
will never visit the site being evaluated but who may benefit from its existence because
the sites they do visit will become less crowded. For a study which confronts these
dilemmas sensibly, see H. GRuBB & J. GooDwiN, supra note 65.
126 The "study area" which served as the basis for the DECS benefits estimates is
described in IES Snomy, PHAsF I, supra note 63, at 1. The counties included are New
Castle County, Delaware; Burlington, Camden, Gloucester, Hunterdon, Mercer and Salem
Counties, New Jersey; and Bucks, Chester, Delaware, Montgomery and Philadelphia
Counties, Pennsylvania.
127 The DECS approach also eliminated some of the relevant population, those who
would seriously consider the improved estuary or sites made less crowded as a result of
estuary cleanup as places for recreation. However, given the distribution of population
in the Delaware Valley and the surrounding area, the DECS "study area" probably con-
tains a large fraction of the relevant population. The deflation of benefits produced by
considering only the population of the 11 counties nearest the estuary therefore seems
relatively small.
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undertake an onerous journey to another country to fulfill their desires
for a good swim, while in fact they were only making the familiar
day-trip on the specially built throughway to Atlantic City 28 In con-
trast, the DECS assumed that the four million residents of the eleven
counties could move costlessly throughout the study area. Since there
are few alternative water resources other than swimming pools in the
eleven counties, the artificial circumscription of the study area natu-
rally ensured a DECS prediction that sections of the estuary made
available for recreation by pollution control would be heavily utilized:
we are presented with the prospect of teeming masses of city dwellers
converging on each square foot of the reclaimed estuary, seeking their
place in the sun.
B. The Concept of "Capacity"
If it had been clearly perceived, such an implausible result would
have called into question the basic premises of the DECS approach.
Unfortunately, the introduction of yet another concept prevented a
retreat to common sense informed by basic economic theory. The
concept which obscured the imperfect DECS logic was a peculiar
notion of "capacity," often used by planners of public projects.'
When understood in one limited sense, "capacity" has a clear, if trivial,
conceptual content. For example, a given stretch of river front is
"filled to capacity" by fishermen when it is so crowded that it is
physically impossible for another fisherman to muscle his way to the
water's edge to conduct his favored activity. This notion of ultimate
physical constraint was not, however, the key to the DECS concept of
capacity. Rather, the DECS used the idea to mask a confused set of
economic and aesthetic premises. For example, the "capacity" of the
estuary for fishing was calculated on the assumption that each fisher-
man in some sense required ten feet of shoreline in order to operate
successfully. Since it is physically possible for fishermen to be spaced
much more closely than this, the fishing "capacity" calculation must
be based on some other ground. The capacity notion might depend
upon a normative judgment about how much shoreline ought, in the
128 Using the method described in note 75 supra, we estimate that the travel time
from center city Philadelphia to Atlantic City along the limited-access Atlantic City Ex-
pressway on an average weekday is 65 minutes. Calculations using the same method sug-
gest that a Philadelphia resident would have to drive for 95 minutes, for example, to
reach Augustine Beach, a potential swimming site in the lower estuary.
129 The concept of capacity is referred to briefly in DECS, supra note 4, at 75. As
note 63 supra explained, the DECS recreation benefits estimates were based on IES
STUDY, supra note 63, which refers to the concept of capacity at several points in its
analysis, e.g., id., PmsE II, at 12, 17-18, 22. See also DECS Final Report, Preliminary
Draft, supra note 87, chs. 3-5 & Figs. 13, 44-45.
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analyst's view, to be allocated to each individual fisherman. However,
it is far from clear that the benefit analyst is entitled to import his
own value judgments into his calculations through the use of a
concept which disguises them from the political actors who are charged
with making the ultimate value decision.
We suspect that, if pressed, the analyst would defend the capacity
concept in a quite different way. Instead of invoking his own personal
norms, he might appeal to an economically based argument which,
though it possesses some surface appeal, is fundamentally miscon-
ceived. In defense of its "capacity" concept, the DECS might have
reasoned that it is only when fishermen become "too" closely packed
along the estuary that they will venture beyond the "study area" to
seek a satisfactory experience. While this argument contains an element
of truth, he "capacity" concept distorts the role of crowding in a
completely unacceptable way. It implies that, so far as the estuary is
concerned, crowding has no effect on fishermen's preferences before
the magic ten-foot standard is reached, and that it is no longer worth
fishing if that standard is exceeded. This is highly implausible. Even
more important, it ignores the fact that recreationists may well choose
to fish at locations outside the "study area" even though the estuary
is not crowded at all, for the simple reason that fishing is more enjoy-
able elsewhere.
C. The "Demand" for Recreation in the Study Area
Having determined the size of the new recreational "capacity"
that would be generated by pollution control expenditure, the DECS
turned to the consideration of whether consumer demand would fill
this increased "capacity." Even at this stage in the analysis, it would
have been possible to transcend the limitations of the DECS conceptual
structure by a set of carefully designed demand estimates, based on
an accurate perception of the relative desirability of the estuary when
compared to other, more popular, recreational areas. No matter how
great the estuary's "capacity," its recreational value would be ap-
preciably diminished if it were ignored by the overwhelming majority
of would-be swimmers, boatsmen and fishermen.
The DECS demand estimates, however, were designed in a way
that obscured the bleak prospects such an inquiry would have disclosed.
To determine the number of days the residents of the eleven-county
area wished to spend boating, fishing and swimming, the DECS took
recourse, as have many other analysts before and since, to a basic
study performed by a special Outdoor Recreation Resources Review
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Commission (ORRRC) sponsored by the Bureau of Outdoor Recrea-
ti6n in the Department of the Interior.
30
The ORRRC study is based on a set of questions asked of a
sample of people over twelve years old throughout the United States
in 1960. The questionnaires asked respondents to report whether or
not they participated at all in a given recreational activity during the
survey period, and, if they participated, how many times they did so.
Each respondent was also asked to supply certain demographic data
about himself including his age, income, sex, race, educational level,
occupation, and residence by locational type. 31 The ORRRC investi-
gators used this information to attempt to determine the rate at which
various groups participate in each of several types of recreational ac-
tivity. Speaking more technically, an ORRRC "participation rate" is
the number of days per year that the average person over twelve in a
well defined subgroup of the population can be expected to engage in
a particular recreational activity.132 Once the participation rate for a
given population subgroup has been determined, obtaining the ORRRC
measure of the total demand for a given recreational activity is simply
an exercise in multiplication. If, for example, there are 10,000 white
males, between the ages of twenty and thirty, earning between $10,000
and $20,000, etc., and ORRRC has found that the participation rate
for fishing for this group is three days per year, then the number of
days the group can be expected to fish in a year is simply 30,000
days.1
33
The aspect of this exercise which is most important for our pur-
1 3 0 
OUTDOOR RECREATION RESOURCES REVIEW COMM'N, STUDY REPORT No. 19, NA-
TIONAL RECREATION SURVEY (1962); OUTDOOR RECREATION RESOURCES REVIEW COMM'N,
STUDY REPORT No. 20, PARTICIPATION IN OUTDOOR RECREATION: FACTORS AFFECTING DE-
mAND AMONG A2u3mrcEmn ADuLTs (1962); OUTDOOR RECREATION REsouRcEs REVIEW
COMM'N, STUDY REPORT No. 26, PROSPECTIVE DMAND FOR OUTDOOR RECREATION (1962)
[hereinafter cited as ORRRC REP. No. 19, 20 or 26].
131 ORRRC REP. No. 19, supra note 130, at 377-87.
132 In ORRRC REP. No. 26, supra note 130, participation rates are generated by a
1-step procedure, using a relatively complicated system based upon the results of ORRRC
REP. No. 20, supra note 130. More recent studies, using the data from ORRRC REP. No.
19, supra note 130, and BUREAU OF OUTDOOR RECREATION, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, 1965
SURVEY OF OUTDOOR RECREATION AcTIvrriEs (1967), have estimated participation rates
using a 2-step procedure. Under this procedure ORRRC first estimates the proportion of
each well defined subgroup which will take part in the given activity at least once in a
given year; it then determines what might be called an activity rate, the number of days
that the average participant in each well-defined subgroup will engage in the given
activity during the year. The product of the percentage participation figure and the
activity rate gives the participation rate. For a summary discussion of these studies and
a comprehensive bibliography, see Cicchetti, A Review of the Empirical Analyses That
Have Been Based Upon the National Recreation Surveys, 4 J. LEISURE REsEARCc 90-107
(1972).
133 The procedure used in ORRRC REP. No. 26, supra note 130, forecasts the par-
ticipation rate for the total population over 12 years in a given geographical area for a
given year by multiplying the participation rate for each well defined subgroup of the
population by the proportion of that subgroup in the population in the year in question,
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poses is its failure to take adequately into account the recreational
opportunities facing each of the respondents in the sample. For sam-
pling purposes the ORRRC divided the entire country into four
regions in calculating its participation rates, and its estimates there-
fore represent the response of a consumer facing the average opportuni-
ties prevailing in each region. Since the DECS made use of the ORRRC
figures for the Northeast, which embraces the Delaware Valley, the
participation rate estimates used in the DECS benefit analysis repre-
sent the rate at which a member of the various subgroups would
engage in a given activity if he faced the average opportunity cost
prevailing in the entire Northeast in 1960. Obviously, an element of
error will enter if the opportunities actually open to residents of the
eleven-county region are not representative of the Northeast. Far more
important for our purposes, however, is the error that will result from
an arbitrary restriction of the area in which the demand will be
satisfied so as to exclude the Jersey Shore, the Upper Delaware, the
Poconos and the Delaware Bay. After restricting its "study area" in
this way, the DECS should no longer have relied on ORRRC demand
estimates, which assumed that the opportunities available within the
"study area" are representative of those prevailing in the entire
Northeast. Only by mistakenly using the ORRRC participation rates
in conjunction with a drastically truncated inventory of recreational
opportunities could the DECS have arrived at its conclusion that
new estuarine opportunities will be fully utilized.'34
The power of a misconceived methodology to blind the analyst is
thrown into high relief when the facts available to the DECS are con-
sidered. According to the DECS method, those sections of the estuary
presently available for high usage fishing (before any water quality
enhancement is undertaken) have a "capacity" to accommodate
390,000 activity days of fishing each fishing season.13' Sufficient
and adding the results. The participation figures so generated are reported in id. 17-19,
and reprinted in IES STUDY, PHASE I, supra note 63, at 81. To obtain total demand for
a given activity in a given year by the total population over 12 in a particular geo-
graphical area, the weighted participation rate described above is multiplied by the total
population figure. This procedure is used to generate the total demand figures in id.,
PHASE 1-, at 5.
184 IES STUDY, PHASE II, supra note 63, at 16 (Table 4), 21 (Table 6), 24 (Table 8).
13 5 Id. 22 (Table 7). The DECS staff seems to have adopted the IES Study figure
in their later work. DECS Final Report, Preliminary Draft, supra note 87, ch. 3B, at
45 (Fig. 13). However, DECS, supra note 4, at 48, gives 1,620,000 activity days per
year as the present capacity of the estuary for fishing. In IES STUDY, PHASE II, supra
note 63, at 22, this figure is reported to be the fishing capacity of nonestuary inland
water in the 11-county study area.
In addition, it should be noted that all the IES capacity calculations (for all the
proposed cleanup programs as well as for existing conditions) contain a fundamental
technical error. The IES fishing capacity formula is:
Ci -. 66(LI) (M) (T) (P)
where .66 is the proportion of the total shoreline in the region of "high usage fishing"
assumed to be accessible; C, is the capacity under Program i (in activity days per year) ;
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"demand" was seen by the DECS to ensure full usage of estimated
estuary capacity.136 Yet the DECS notes elsewhere that in fact fisher-
men spend only 130,000 activity days along the estuary .annually.l3a
The unsettling implications of this fact are simply ignored-for ac-
cording to DECS, fishermen should be neatly spaced every ten feet at
all times during the fishing season. Although this inconsistency should
constitute a source of embarrassment for the DECS, it poses no particu-
lar difficulty for the economist's approach. All it suggests is that
fishermen in heavily populated areas, when faced with the choice of
traveling substantial distances either to estuarine high usage fishing
sites or to ocean, lake or stream sites outside the "study area," choose
overwhelmingly the nonestuarine options.
D. Attacking Money Values
We have now come to the moment of truth in any benefit analysis,
the point at which the benefits of the project are translated into money
values. Under the economist's approach that we elaborated in Section
III, the rationale for money evaluation is straightforward. The analyst
simply seeks to estimate the amount consumers would be willing to
sacrifice rather than do without the new facilities. Given the DECS
methodology, however, it was impossible for the analyst either to pose
the sacrifice question in coherent form or to devise a means by which
even a rough answer could be supplied. For in order to think in terms
of the sacrifice principle, it is necessary to have (a) a clear idea of the
recreational options open to consumers prior to pollution control ex-
penditure; (b) a careful account of the kinds of physical changes
pollution control will generate; and (c) an estimate of the extent to
Li is the total shore length designated for "high usage fishing" under Program i (in
feet) ; M is the average spacing of anglers (1 person per 10 feet) ; T is the turnover rate
(2 anglers per space per day); and P is the average number of activity days per fisher-
man (20 activity days per person per year). Id.; DECS Final Report, Preliminary Draft,
supra note 87, ch. 3B, at 20 (Table 4). The product of .66L,, M and T yields the num-
ber of anglers who could hypothetically be accommodated along the estuary per day. The
number of anglers who can be accommodated in 1 day should be multiplied by the num-
ber of activity days per angler per day, presumably 1, and then by an estimate of the
length of the fishing season in days to obtain a meaningful measure of capacity. A con-
ceptually consistent formula is:
C, = .66 (Li) (M) (T) (K) (S)
where K is activity days per angler per day, presumably 1; and S is the length of the
fishing season in days. The use of P in the formula employed by the IES Study and the
DECS Final Report yields a nonsense result.
136 See IES Srumt, PBAsE II, supra note 63, at 24 (Table 8).
137 The 130,000 activity days per year present usage figure, DECS, supra note 4, at
48, is not explained in any of the documents we have been able to obtain. In the DECS
Final Report, Preliminary Draft, supra note 87, ch. 3B, at 12, this figure was reduced
to 51,750 activity days per year. The 51,750 figure was obtained by multiplying 7,960
fishermen, an estimate of the number using the estuary per day, see note 103 supra, by
6.5 activity days per year per fisherman, an estimate made by the DECS. This procedure
is fundamentally misconceived: in order to obtain a sensible usage figure, 7,960 should be
multiplied by an estimate of the length of the fishing season, not by an estimate of the
number of days the average man fishes.
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which consumers will modify their conduct in the light of their new
options. As we have seen, at each basic stage in the DECS analysis
concepts were developed which obscured the simple logic of this ap-
proach. The DECS definition of the "study area," its notion of
"capacity," and its effort to derive "demand" estimates which were
not closely tied to a clear conception of available opportunities both
before and after pollution control, all made it impossible to ask: "How
much money is it reasonable to expect the residents of the Delaware
Valley to sacrifice in exchange for the changes in their environmental
situation wrought by each of the proposed programs?"
As the DECS was unable to articulate this basic question, it is
not surprising that its translation of benefits into money terms was
fundamentally arbitrary. Even if it were otherwise flawless, the DECS
analysis indicates merely that the new "capacity" generated by pollu-
tion control would be utilized. Yet this, in itself, is insufficient; in the
absence of water quality improvement, the "new" recreationists on the
reclaimed portions of the Delaware would have been doing something
else. What a benefit analysis must determine, in one way or another,
is the extent to which recreationists consider themselves better off as a
result of their change in activity. Precluded by its own methodology
from appealing to informed common sense, the DECS Report-like
many other studies before and since-was obliged instead to resort
to a set of dollar figures which are enshrined in Supplement No. 1 to
Senate Document 97.138 This Supplement, published in 1964, reports
the general consensus of experts in the field of recreational benefit
evaluation as to the dollar value to be associated with each of a wide
range of recreational activities. It should be plain that this platonic
approach is of no value; for it attempts to establish the intrinsic
worth of a day of fishing independently of the other opportunities
available to a region's fishermen. It should be banished from all sub-
sequent efforts at an economic analysis of the problems posed by
environmental degradation.'39
138 S. Doc. No. 97, S-upp. No. 1, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1964). A "general" outdoor
recreation day is said to be worth between $.50 and $1.50 while a "specialized" outdoor
recreation day is worth between $2.00 and $6.00. The activities which are supposed to
fall into each of the 2 categories are set out in detail, id. 3.
139 The idea that an activity day of recreation has an intrinsic worth has not yet
been banished from the analysis of recreation benefits. Recently a group of experts work-
ing for the Water Resources Council took notice of the relevance of consumers' willing-
ness to pay in placing money values on a project, Water Resources Council, Proposed
Principles and Standards for Planning Water and Related Land Resources, 36 Fed. Reg.
24,144, 24,157 (1971), but went on nevertheless to recommend unit values for recreation
days. A "general" recreation day is now supposed to be worth between $.75 and $2.25;
a "specialized" dayshould currently be valued at between $3 and $9. According to the
Council, unit values must still be used because recreation evaluation methodology is not
well enough developed to yield a better measure of results. Where this is the case, it
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E. Introducing the Time Dimension
There remains one aspect of the DECS approach to be considered.
Up to the present point, we have not directly confronted the problem
posed by the fact that the benefits generated by pollution control ac-
crue over time. In order to take this fact into account, the DECS
followed a common, straightforward approach. First, it assumed that
only benefits accruing within a twenty-year period from the date on
which the analysis was undertaken were relevant in assessing the
desirability of the competing control programs; thus the relevant time
horizon became 1965-1985.14° Second, it attempted to establish the
money value of the recreational benefits that would accrue in a base
year, using the method we have criticized above. In this case, the base
year was 1976, the approximate midpoint of the selected time horizon.
Third, it was assumed that the dollar value of the benefits accruing
in 1976 would also be realized in each of the other nineteen years
considered relevant.14' Fourth, a discount rate of three percent was
used to calculate the present value of the twenty year benefit stream. 42
There are several major issues raised by this procedure. The first
involves the definition of the time horizon, which seems too short for
two reasons. We have been told by DECS personnel that a substantial
portion of the pollution control equipment has an economic life ex-
pectancy somewhat longer than twenty years. This consideration alone
suggests the desirability of a somewhat more distant time horizon, say
twenty-five years. More important, however, is the fact that the
installation of hundreds of millions of dollars of pollution control
seems to us far better for the analyst to confess his ignorance than to generate a set of
numbers which could obscure issues. For criticisms of other aspects of the Water Re-
sources Council's proposals, see C. CIccnETTi, R. DAvS, S. HANEE, R. HAvEMAN & J.
KNETSCH, BENEFITS OR COSTS? AN ASSESSMENT oF THE WATER RESOURCES CoucE.cIls
PROPOSED PRINCIPLES AND STANDARDS (1972).
140 DECS, supra note 4, at 76. What the DECS did and what it said it did are not
always easily reconcilable. The DECS Report states that "[t]he maximum and minimum
values of the range of recreational benefits to 1975-80 were computed on the following
basis .... " Id. This seems to imply that the horizon considered was at most 15 years
(1965-1980). The Report also states that "[iun accordance with other economic calcula-
tions in this report, the 1975-80 recreation benefits in terms of 1964 dollars are reported
as Present Values calculated with an interest rate of 3% and a time horizon of 20 years."
Id. Letter from E. Smith, supra note 30, produced the statement that "tt]he important
thing here is that the annual monetary values are discounted to compute the present
values at 3%, 20 yr." The DECS staff apparently intended to use a time horizon of 20
years beginning with 1965, and there is no doubt that such a time horizon is implied by
their calculations.
141 Letter from E. Smith, supra note 30, confirmed both that 1976 was used as the
base year and that the DECS assumed, at least implicitly, that the monetary benefits
which would accrue in 1976 would also accrue in each of the other 19 years. It can also
be shown that this assumption is necessary in order to reconcile the annual figures for
1976 given in IES STuDY, PHASE II, supra note 63, at 54 (Table 22), with the present
value figures presented in DECS, supra note 4, at 77 (Table 20).
14 2 DECS, supra note 4, at 76.
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equipment distributed along the eighty-six mile estuary is a time-
consuming process. Even on an optimistic view of the regulatory
process, the DECS should have anticipated a lag of five years before
the entire control system was in effective operation. Thus it would
appear that a thirty-year time horizon would have been more appro-
priate than the twenty-year period selected. 43
Second, the DECS assumption that the benefits prevailing in
1976 would be available in each of the nineteen other years between
1965 and 1985 is suspect. At best, these benefits would be available
only after the five-year regulatory lag we have mentioned, during
which the system would not yet be in operation. Indeed this is one of
the reasons we have argued for a thirty-year time horizon, since, given
the five-year lag, benefits will accrue for only fourteen or fifteen years
of the time horizon used by the DECS Report. Thus, it would appear
that the DECS neglect of regulatory lag is counterbalanced at least
partially by its improper truncation of the time horizon. Sometimes,
two errors may be better than one.
The DECS neglect of the implications of the regulatory lag ap-
pears somewhat more troublesome when considered in light of another
aspect of its procedure: the method used to calculate the present value
of the anticipated benefit stream. Although few benefits will be gener-
ated until virtually the entire system is in operation, a substantial
portion of the capital costs of pollution control will be incurred during
the first five years as one after another of the estuary's dischargers
is induced to comply with the DRBC's regulations. Thus, instead
of the DECS assumption of instantaneous compliance coupled with
the realization of maximum benefits in the first year of the time period,
a more realistic view is suggested in Figure 5. Since it is the essence
of any discounting procedure that earlier years count for more than
later years, the pattern of benefits and costs which takes the regulatory
lag into account is less favorable to pollution control than the DECS
hypothesis which unrealistically neglects the lag.
We come finally to the DECS choice of three per cent as the ap-
propriate rate to use in calculating the present value of costs and
benefits. In light of the ongoing controversy over whether the appropri-
143 If, as is likely, investments are made at different times, the useful lives of these
investments will end at different times. If pollution control equipment really lasts only
about 20 years and a 30-year time horizon is chosen, new investment toward the end of
the time period will be required by those firms which comply early. The costs of these
added investments as well as the fact that equipment installed near the end of the period
will have several more years of useful life after the 30-year time horizon is passed must
be taken into consideration.
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ate discount rate for public projects should be equal to one of the rates
of return prevailing in the private sector or to a figure somewhat lower
or higher than prevailing market rates,144 it would seem prudent for
the cost-benefit analyst to generate calculations using a range of
different discount rates. This would properly focus the attention of
the political process on the importance of an informed debate about,
and principled resolution of, this basic issue. Of course, the higher the
rate used, the lower the level of pollution control which will seem
desirable, because a large proportion of control costs accrue early in
the time period, whereas the benefits are spread evenly through the
years. Although the fate of a large number of public projects depends
critically upon the resolution of the issues surrounding the selection
of an appropriate rate of discount, it is a common mistake to assume
that this controversy vitiates entirely the usefulness of the cost-benefit
14 4 A good summary of the arguments of those who support the use of one of the
rates of return prevailing in the private economy is contained in Hirshleifer & Shapiro,
The Treatment of Risk and Uncertainty, PUBLIC EXPENDITURES AND POLICY ANALYSIS
291 (R. Haveman & J. Margolis eds. 1970). The view that policy makers should use a
rate different from private rates of return is presented in S. MAROLIN, PUBLIC INVEST-
1IENT CRrrERiA 98 (1967). For other provocative contributions to the debate, see A.
HARBERGER, ON MEASURING THE SOCIAL OPPORTUNITY COST OF PUBLIC FUNDS (1971);
Baumol, On the Discount Rate for Public Projects, in PUBLIC EXPENDITURES AND POLICY
ANALYSIS 273, supra.
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tool. The case before us provides a powerful counterexample. A
sensible economic analysis inevitably would have concluded that
even if the rate chosen were zero, no program which contemplated
spending hundreds of millions of dollars on DO improvement along
the "polluted" section of the Delaware could be justified by the
negligible benefits provided the region's boaters and swimmers and
the modest benefits offered to the region's fishermen.'45
V. BEYOND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS:
WEIGHING THE "UNQUANTIFIABLE"
Even if it is conceded that the economist cannot make a case
for massive investment of hundreds of millions of dollars in a program
which will raise DO levels marginally on the Delaware, it does not
follow that proper policy can be based on this single insight. Indeed,
it is a truism that many benefits generated by environmental protection
are "unquantifiable" and hence are beyond the economist's ken. Only
by going beyond the level of platitude to examine the precise senses
in which economic analysis provides an inadequate guide to policy,
however, can we fairly assess the value of the current effort on the
Delaware.
A. Defining the Unquantifiable: Ecological Catastrophe
Benefit analysis of the kind we have attempted has sought to
place a value upon improved opportunities for doing relatively common
things-a day's boating or fishing or swimming-and thus seems far
removed from the predictions of impending ecological doom which
have been heard with increasing frequency over the past decade.
Nonetheless, in the strict sense, the value of avoiding world doom is not
unquantifiable. Indeed, it seems safe to assume that the present in-
habitants of Earth would pay almost everything in their possession to
avoid imminent destruction.
Thus, there is nothing difficult about quantifying the costs of
human extinction. The only difficulty for our purposes lies in assessing
the chances that adopting Program II rather than Program V for the
145 As we have explained, note 63 supra, the DECS recognized its own lack of ex-
pertise in the field of benefit analysis and contracted the task out to a leading academic
body in the region, the Institute for Environmental Studies of the University of Penn-
sylvania. When the IES study group completed its project and provided the DECS with
numbers, its contractual obligations had been fully satisfied. Neither the DECS, the
DRBC nor the federal government has funded any further analysis of the benefits gen-
erated by the cleanup program in the 6 years since the IES completed its work-another
example of the failure to take adequate institutional steps to assure continuing reappraisal
of complex and ongoing problems. See text accompanying notes 50-54 supra; Ackerman
& Sawyer, supra note 1, at 489-95. For a more elaborate analysis, see B. ACKERMAXA,
supra note 7, chs. 5, 10.
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Delaware River will measurably affect the probability of continued
survival. Even here, the °question is susceptible of an easy answer if
one assumes that pollution loads on other river systems do not in-
crease over time. Once this assumption is made, we have found no
reputable scientist who believes that the absence of various forms of
aquatic life in the "critical regions" around Philadelphia has any
significant impact upon the human race's prospects for continued sur-
vival. This opinion, coupled with the simple fact that the Delaware's
DO problem does not impair the ability of modern treatment plants
to provide potable water at a low cost, seems to destroy the notion that
the selection even of Program I over Program V will have a significant
impact upon the prospects of continued human life.
A problem arises only if our critical ceteris paribus assumption
is relaxed and a world is imagined in which all (or at least a large
number) of river systems resemble the oxygen-depleted portion of the
estuary. It is only then that a serious ecological risk to man may be
discerned, although our knowledge in this regard is so imperfect that
the number of oxygen-depleted river segments which can be tolerated
without any significant risk of cataclysm is indeed unquantifiable at
present. Nevertheless, it does not follow from this insight that the
DRBC program can be placed on a solid, if unquantifiable, intellectual
foundation.
First, even after $700 million is spent to raise the Delaware's DO
profile marginally, the critical region of the river will still not be an
important source of diverse aquatic life. Second, the DO threat should
not be considered apart from other ecological risks with which our
society is confronted. In light of our society's present tolerance of the
discharge of substantial quantities of poisons, heavy metals and un-
known chemicals into its streams, it seems capricious to single out
the DO threat as justifying such enormous expenditures. If a fraction
of the money spent on the removal of oxygen-demanding wastes were
instead devoted to understanding and stringently controlling the im-
pact of these other types of pollution on the Delaware River, the
results could well *prove far more important to human health and
survival.
Third, even if the Delaware's critical region of DO depletion
should be given more importance on ecological-catastrophe grbunds
than seems justified at present, it will be possible at some point in the
future to reconsider the matter while incurring little cost in the interim.
Program V, contemplating the maintenance of existing water quality,
carries a pricetag which is far smaller than that of the program
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actually adopted by the DRBC.146 Moreover, the fact that oxygen-
demanding wastes will continue to be discharged in substantial quanti-
ties for the next decade or longer will not make it appreciably more
difficult to improve DO whenever the decision is taken. For the
oxygen-demanding wastes we are discussing are biodegradable and
hence do not generate long-lived effects. Indeed, the costs of waste
removal a decade or two hence should be far lower than at present,
because for the first time in history considerable funds are now being
expended on research and development of new forms of treatment
technology.
In conclusion, as soon as it is recognized that we can tolerate the
existence of some river segments with a relatively low DO, it would
seem only prudent to permit those rivers which are most expensive
to improve to remain in a degraded condition. Even if we posit that
the worldwide DO problem is serious enough to justify the expensive
improvement of DO profiles in the northeastern quadrant of the United
States in order to prevent ecological catastrophe, it seems clear that
DO should be improved along rivers like the Potomac 47 and the
Susquehanna, where DO improvements can be generated at lower cost,
rather than along rivers like the Delaware and Hudson, which have
borne the brunt of twentieth century technology.
B. Defining the Unquantifiable: Man and Nature
in Industrialized Society.
Even if it is conceded that the DRBC's investment program
cannot be justified by invoking a plausible, though unquantifiable,
threat to human health or existence, there remains another dimension
to the problem which may be considered unquantifiable in a different
sense. This factor requires a consideration of rather abstract issues
concerning the place that the human species ought to play in the
natural order.
1. The Rights of Nonhuman Species
When the economist attempts to quantify the benefits of an
environmental improvement in dollar terms, he is only considering
the amount of money human beings will sacrifice for the improvement.
To consider the case at hand, the DECS attempted to calculate the
benefit accruing to fishermen as a result of an increased population
1
4 6 See Table 1 accompanying note 15 supra.
147 For a good discussion of the DO problem in the Potomac, see R. DAVIS, THE
RANGE or CHOICE IN WATER MANAGEmENT: A STUDY oF DISsoLvED OXYGEN IN THE
POTowAc ESTUARY (1968).
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of fish in the estuary. One looks in vain to the economist to provide a
value of the benefit accruing to fish, which have no money to sacrifice.
Thus, the adequacy of the economist's approach may be attacked on
the ground that the present distribution of economic power between
man and other forms of nature is unjust.
This claim is obviously grounded in an ethical-religious concep-
tion of the proper relationship between man and nature, but so is the
claim of the skeptic who responds that man is the measure of all things
and the fate of other forms of life should be determined by man's
convenience. The validity of neither is self-evident.
Although a systematic discussion of these matters is beyond the
scope of this Article 48 some progress can be made in understanding
the issues if we first colsider two extreme positions. Imagine, for
example, that the critic of economic cost-benefit analysis were to
claim that the life of even one shad is priceless and hence that the
DRBC's effort to improve the DO profile is well worth the $700
million it will cost. While this argument may be made sincerely, it
rests upon premises that are not generally accepted in our society.
For example, it would seem to require a universal commitment to
vegetarianism, because it is inconsistent to demand that society
refrain from the unintentional killing of fish through the discharge of
oxygen-demanding wastes while tolerating the intentional murder of
fish for food. In order to make his position more widely acceptable
to contemporary mores, the critic could argue instead that although
men may destroy animal life for some purposes, they may not destroy
animals simply to permit human beings the benefits of industrialized
society. In a society that tolerates 50,000 human deaths each year for
the sake of automobile transportation, however, he would still fail to
win a significant number of adherents to his view.
Because an absolute prohibition on the foreseeable destruction
of animals for the purpose of technological advance is inconsistent
with the premises of contemporary life, the critic of man-centered
cost-benefit analysis must revise his position once again and offer a
more modest formulation if he is to have a realistic opportunity to
persuade his fellow citizens. Although the consequences of twentieth
century industrialism cannot be undone, it does not follow that the
148 Only a few preliminary efforts have been made to treat this issue systematically.
See, e.g., Morris, The Rights and Duties of Beasts and Trees: A Law Teacher's Essay
for Landscape Architects, 17 J. LEGAL ED. 185 (1964); Stone, Should Trees Have Stand-
ing?-Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 450 (1972); Tribe,
Technology Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity: The Limits of Instrumental
Rationality, 46 S. CAL. L. REv. 617, 641-57 (1973); cf. J. RAws, A TnoRY or JusTICE
512 (1971); R. Nozici, ANAmcav, STATE, AND UToPiA (forthcoming).
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conflict of interest between industrialized man and lesser beasts
should always be resolved to suit man's convenience. Instead, the
critic may propose that men recognize the claim of nonhuman beings
by assuring that a broad range of animal and plant life exists in a
substantial geographic range under conditions that these life forms
find congenial, even though this goal is inconsistent with the results of
man-centered cost-benefit analysis.
Even if, however, most people assented to the notion that the
human race has an obligation to assure that a broad range of animal
and plant life survives, it seems implausible that this obligation would
be stretched to cover the DRBC's program to improve DO along the
Delaware. As the Delaware's "polluted" region will not maintain a
truly diverse and vibrant range of acquatic life even after the DRBC's
cleanup, it would seem wiser to invest substantial resources in the
protection and enhancement of rivers which could promise greater
returns in this regard. At the same time, existing water quality levels
in the Delaware seem perfectly sufficient to maintain a sustaining
population of Atlantic shad. Shad runs in the less-polluted estuaries
on the eastern seaboard make one doubly sure that there is no
serious risk of extinction. Finally, because the polluted segment of the
estuary flows through a densely populated urban region, the interests
of the resident land-based animal life in high water quality, which is so
important in other contexts, need not be given great weight.
Of course, if more than enough funds were available to preserve
and protect large wilderness areas and relatively untouched river
systems against the threat of encroaching industrialism, the problems
posed by DO depletion in the Delaware might be given serious con-
sideration. However, satisfying nonhuman needs can only be accomp-
lished at the cost of not satisfying human wints, which are often quite
pressing. There would come a point, probably long before the Delaware
problem was reached, at which further diversion of resources to non-
human beings would not be acceptable even in a society which sub-
scribed strongly to the obligation we have posited.
2. The Human Interest in the Integrity of Nature
The final criticism of conventional cost-benefit analysis that we
shall consider is related to, but different from, the one we have just
assessed. Instead of declaring that nonhuman life has a value in its
own right, the critic may suggest that humans will obtain psychic
satisfaction simply by knowing that the integrity of nonhuman life
forms is being respected. The critic would insist that although a
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citizen may never himself engage in outdoor activities, he may well
be willing to sacrifice a substantial amount of money simply to give
himself the satisfaction of knowing that Nature is preserved. This, of
course, is an extreme case of "naturalism." The less extreme but more
common case is represented by a person who does physically use a re-
source but is also willing to sacrifice something to preserve it regard-
less of whether he would ever use the resource. If this amount is sub-
stantial, it must be considered an important benefit of cleaning up
the river that our earlier economic analysis failed to consider.
A rigorous estimate of the amount of money that "naturalists"
are willing to sacrifice could easily elude the economist-researcher. The
only way of estimating the money value of this benefit is to interview
a sample of the population. Yet interviewees would have a powerful
incentive to exaggerate the extent of their psychic benefits unlass, of
course, they were actually obliged to sacrifice funds to save nonhuman
life forms. If, however, an actual donation to a conservation fund
were required, naturalists would then have a substantial incentive to
pay an amount far less than their full psychic cost, knowing that the
size of their individual contributions could have little effect on the
total amount collected.
These problems, which are familiar ones in the evaluation of
public goods,'49 clarify another distinct sense in which benefits can
be said to be unquantifiable. Nevertheless, it is once again premature
to conclude that the isolation of this unquantifiable factor will lead to
the vindication of a program, like the one on the Delaware, which
cannot otherwise be justified. The focus of the naturalist's concern
must be considered quite precisely. It is not enough to know, for
example, that our society contains many naturalists and that they
would be willing to sacrifice billions and billions to preserve Nature,
considered globally. Instead, we must discover the extra amount they
are willing to spend on a particular resource (the "critical" region
in the Delaware) to satisfy their psychic interest. As soon as this is
understood, an appeal to the unquantifiable benefits accruing to
naturalists from DO improvement along the Delaware seems quite
problematic.
It is true, of course, that many would feel poorer after having
learned that a site of exceptional value-like the Grand Canyon-has
substantially deteriorated, regardless of whether they intended to visit
the place. It seems far less plausible to assume, however, that many
would be similarly affected if they learned that the "critical region"
14 9 For an illuminating discussion, see M. OLsoN, THE LOGIC OF CoLLECTIV ACTION
(1965).
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of the Delaware River, from which Nature in any real sense has long
since vanished, would not be partially rehabilitated.
Of course, the deteriorated condition of a particular site may be
taken as a symbol of a more general deterioration in the environment
which threatens a generalized interest in the continuing integrity of
the world of Nature. Nevertheless, if naturalists were assured that
society was fulfilling a policy, of the type discussed in the preceding'
section, which guaranteed a broadly based animal and plant life in
areas congenial to these nonhuman forms, it is quite likely that they
would no longer experience the same degree of concern when learning
that the basic inconsistency between urban industrialism and Nature
had not been universally resolved in favor of the latter. This is not to
deny that the typical naturalist would continue to feel some regret at
the tension between Man and Nature. We merely suggest that he would
be unlikely to sacrifice a substantial sum to alleviate a particular
symptom of this tension, such as the DO sag in the Delaware estuary,
if a conservation effort of the sort we have suggested were being made
in more appropriate locales.
Even apart from the problems which ordinarily inhere in the
valuation of public goods, there is no way to verify this claim
empirically. The fact remains that many thinking people attracted by
naturalism have not yet been able to sort out their commitments in
the relatively short time since environmentalism has risen to promi-
nence. Given our own values, however, we are unwilling to impute to
the bulk of the population the extreme form of naturalism required to
justify an attack on the Delaware's DO profile when so much remains
to be done to satisfy other human aspirations which themselves may
be grounded in a compelling sense of justice.
VI. CoNcLUSIONS
This essay has had two major purposes. First, we have attempted,
by the careful inspection of the costs and benefits of a typical project,
to invite a reconsideration of the basic premises of environmental
regulation as it is evolving in the United States. Second, we have at-
tempted to give the reader a sense of the gap between the economic
theory of cost-benefit analysis and its actual practice, even in a study
as carefully done as the DECS Report. In attempting to fulfill these
purposes, we have refrained from moving too far away from our
case study in order to give the reader an opportunity to use the data
we have presented to form his own judgments on the basic issues. It
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does not seem inappropriate at this stage, however, to elaborate more
fully on the general implications of our case study.
A. The Substance of Environmental Policy
It is easy to imagine that when society decides to spend three
quarters of a billion dollars to "clean up" a forty-mile stretch of
river around Philadelphia, something significant will come of it.
The mind rebels at the thought that even these vast sums could be
spent in vain. Yet in 1978 or 1980 or 1984, when the DRBC an-
nounces to the world that it has "succeeded" in achieving its DO
objectives on the river, the Delaware River will be just as cloudy as it
ever was; it will be just as difficult to obtain access to the river;
boating will be neither better nor worse than it was; the drinking
water will taste the same as it always did. Perhaps good fishing will
be a few minutes closer, and during some years more shad will survive
their journey up and down the main stem. Is this what all the talk
about improving "the quality of life" amounts to? The questionwill
be asked not only in the Delaware Valley, but in every major industri-
alized area in the nation. For Congress, as we shall see, has adopted
the equivalent of the DRBC's objectives (Program II) to serve as
national policy for the 1970's.15o Although the consequences of an
improvement in DO levels will vary from case to case, there is no
reason to expect that the Delaware is not a typical example of the
fate of current policy in heavily industrialized areas.
As the meager results of this aspect of the "environmental revolu-
tion" become apparent, the public may lose much of its interest in
"the environment" and search for another ideal which has not yet
been tarnished by serious commitment. But simply because the funda-
mental premise of current policy is mistaken, it does not follow that
there is not much of value in environmentalism. Indeed, a review of
the reasons for finding that the critical region of the Delaware is the
wrong place to lavish environmental concerns reveals a sounder policy
by contrast. Investing enormous sums in an effort to improve the
Delaware's DO profile is wrong because:
1. It does nothing to control the discharge of poisons which may
threaten the health of those who depend on the water for drinking
supplies.
1 51
1 5 0 See text accompanying notes 164-66 infra.
151 Curiously, at the same time a massive effort is being made to improve the DO
profile throughout the nation, both the Environmental Protection Agency and the Gen-
eral Accounting Office report that the quality of drinking water in a large number of
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2. It does little to improve the recreational opportunities open to
residents of the region.
3. It does little to improve the environment of nonhuman forms
of life compared to the probable results of the expenditure of a similar
sum of money on the preservation and development of areas which are
relatively untouched by urban industrialism.
4. It does little to minimize the long term ecological risk to man-
kind's continued existence, compared to the probable results of the
expenditure of similar sums on other pollutants and in other river
basins located in less heavily populated areas.
This summary indictment of the Delaware's program has been
framed, of course, to suggest the goals of an alternative environmental
program which would yield greater benefits than our present course.
Pursuit of these objectives would require decisionmakers to develop
a clear distinction between goals which are appropriate in the manage-
ment of heavily industrialized sectors and those suitable for control of
water resources which remain relatively untouched by twentieth-
century life.1"' It is in these latter areas where the unquantifiable
concerns ignored by cost-benefit analysis should be given an important
place in policy. Substantial sums should be expended, first to pre-
serve and then to expand the opportunities for nonhuman life forms
to thrive in a congenial environment. In so doing, policymakers will of
course simultaneously be taking steps that will significantly limit the
risk of long range ecological damage to mankind and will also pre-
serve important recreational resources for outdoorsmen.
153
The task of managing heavily industrialized river segments
should be undertaken in a different spirit. It should be recognized that
our society is unwilling to expend the billions and billions required to
transform a place like the Delaware's critical zone into an area in
areas leaves much to be desired. See S. REP. No. 93-231, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1973).
Much could be done to improve the situation by introducing new methods of water
treatment which, though costly, would be far less expensive than the present misguided
effort to clean up oxygen-demanding discharges. The focus of current legislation on the
control of these discharges may have just the opposite effect. The New York Times re-
cently reported that water and sewer departments throughout the nation, faced with
the enormous expense of improving their effluent treatment, have been cutting back their
treatment of drinking water. N.Y. Times, May 13, 1973, at 8, col. 3.
152 Our distinction between "urban" and "nonurban" environmental policy relies on
the traditional welfare economist's case for "separate facilities solutions." See J. DALES,
POLLUTION, PROPERTY, & PRICES (1968); Mishan, Pareto Optimality and the Law, 19
(N.S.) OxFoRD ECONOMIC PAPERS 255 (1967).
153 In saying this, we do not mean to minimize the conflicts which may arise when
a decisionmaker seeks to reserve a natural area for both the purpose of preserving wild-
life and the purpose of mass recreation. The presence of human beings in large numbers,
even when they are simply enjoying themselves in outdoor pursuits, may endanger eco-
logical balances and the ability of nonhuman forms to thrive. In such cases, a funda-
mentally unquantifiable judgment must be made, balancing the competing interests at
stake.
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which Nature pure and pristine shall reign once again. Decisions to
improve separate aspects of the environment in such areas should be
governed by the astute use of cost-benefit analysis. Although, if we are
correct, improving the DO profile on the main stem of the estuary is
not warranted by such analysis, there may be circumstances in which
attempting a massive cleanup of an urban waterway would be justified
in economic terms. Some likely locations may even be found in the
Delaware Valley itself. The Schuylkill River, for example, is one of
the major tributaries of the Delaware, and flows through the center
of the City of Philadelphia, as well as a large portion of its suburbs.
To make matters more promising for the would-be recreationist, ac-
cess to the river is assured even in the heart of the city as the river
flows through one of the largest urban parks in the United States.
Although at the present time the river is the scene of substantial
boating activity, making it a safe place for swimming would be an
expensive proposition. It would require, among other things, the
diversion of storm sewer runoff from the Schuylkill to the main stem
of the Delaware, the stringent control of oil slicks and similar
nuisances, and the imposition of extremely high treatment require-
ments *on the discharge of organic waste within a twenty-five mile
distance upriver from the swimming zone. Nevertheless, the total
being undertaken on the far more heavily industrialized main stem of
expense may be a good deal less than the DO program currently
the river. Moreover, the successful completion of the Schuylkill plan
would at least permit hundreds of thousands of citizens-many from
the black ghetto-to have a far more pleasant summer than is cur-
rently the case.
In speaking of the possibilities of swimming in the Schuylkill,
we do not mean to suggest that the merits of this program can be
established without careful study. It is not self-evident that the money
that cleaning up the Schuylkill would require would not be better spent
on providing better schools for Philadelphians or, indeed, on provid-
ing other sorts of consumer goods through the private sector. We only
wish to use the Schuylkill as an example of the kind of program
which would be seriously considered if current policy were predicated
upon a sophisticated conception of a plausible relationship between
man and nature in contemporary society. Indeed, it seems to us quite
extraordinary that most policymakers who were asked about the
Schuylkill plan dismissed it as "impractical" (although its technical
feasibility was not seriously questioned), while all thought it eminently
"practical" to expend vast resources to achieve a pyrrhic victory over
the DO sag on the Delaware's main stem.
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So far as the Delaware's.main stem is concerned, attention should
be focused upon the discharge of exotic chemicals and heavy metals,
which may well pose a palpable risk to human health when present
in the water supply or in aquatic life. Paradoxically, the real cause
for concern along the Delaware is not that the shad face extinction,
but that a shad will survive only to be caught and served on the family
table. For fish, by virtue both of their metabolism and their position
on the food chain, may contain substantial concentrations of harmful
substances which are present only in minute quantities in the water.'54
Although the precise magnitude of this risk to human health is unclear
at present, a cost-benefit analyst would be justified in erring on the
side of caution and recommending stringent controls on the esoteric
discharges in question.'55 Curiously, while the DRBC has labored
long on the DO issue, its concern with what should be its first priority
on the estuary has been intermittent and primitive at best.'56 Indeed,
this modest concern seems quite typical of the nation as a whole; 15 7
even the technology required to detect, let alone control, the presence
O various metals and exotic chemicals is not in widespread use.3
B. A Critique of the Federal Water Quality Control
Act Amendments of 1972
Having elaborated the basic substantive principles suggested by
our analysis, we are in a position to assess the extent to which federal
154 See, e.g., Hearings on the Effects of Mercury on Man and the Environment Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Energy, Natural Resources, & the Environment of the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); Berglund & Berlin, Human Risk
Evaluation for Various Populations in Sweden Due to Methylmercury in Fish, in
CHEMICAL FALLOUT: CURRENT RESEARCH IN PERSISTANT PESTICDES 423 .(M. Miller & G.
Berg eds. 1969); Hazards of Mercury, Special Report to the Secretary's Pesticide Ad-
visory Committee, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 4 ENVIONMENTAL
RSEARCH 1 (1971).
155 For an intelligent discussion of the desirability of preserving options and allocat-
ing the burden of uncertainty, see NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, TECHNOLOGY: PROCESS
OF ASSESSMENT AND CHOICE 32-39 (1969).
156 Conversations with DRBC officials who prefer to remain anonymous, summer
1970.
157 For a discussion of the primitive legal tools currently being relied upon to con-
trol aquatic life which may contain hazardous substances, see Note, Health Regulation of
Naturally Hazardous Foods: The FDA Ban on Swordfish, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1025 (1972).
158 On the relatively undeveloped state of surveillance, see Brown & Duncan, Legal
Aspects of a Federal Water Quality Surveillance System, 68 MICH. L. REv. 1131 (1970).
Section 307 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C.A.
§ 1317 (Supp. 1973), provides for the establishment of effluent controls on toxic sub-
stances; such controls are not to be determined with an eye to the costs which they im-
pose, H. R. REP. No. 92-911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 113 (1972) [hereinafter cited as H. R.
REP.], and may include absolute prohibition. However, the Administrator of the En-
vironmental Protection Agency has discretion both in selecting the toxic substances which
will be regulated under § 1317 and in setting the level of control. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1317
(a) (1) (Supp. 1973). Section 308 of the amendments, id. § 1318, provides for monitoring
to enforce standards but does not require that a systematic program be undertaken. It
remains to be seen how effective such a vague mandate will be in remedying the defi-
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policy-as established in the most ambitious piece of environmental
legislation yet passed by Congress-deviates from our recommenda-
tions. Since this is not the place for an exhaustive discussion of the
eighty-nine pages of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amend-
ments of 1972,151 we shall limit our treatment to basic issues of
principle.
First, the statute fails to distinguish between heavily industrialized
rivers and those whose DO can be improved at relatively little cost.
Although in setting the nationwide effluent limitations for which the
Act provides, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) may divide
polluters into subclasses to take into account "the facilities involved,
the process employed" 60 and similar factors, the agency is not
authorized to treat similar plants differently on the basis of their
differential impacts upon the environment. Thus, the Agency's effluent
limitations will not reflect our contention that it may make sense
to impose extremely demanding requirements upon a factory dis-
charging materials in the near-virgin expanses of Lake Superior,' 6 '
but not upon an identical factory located in the critical region of the
Delaware.
Second, rather than accept the inevitable conflict between nature
and industrialized society and look for ways to ameliorate this tension,
the Act strikes a romantic pose with its declaration that "it is the
national goal that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable water
be eliminated by 1985."' 162 A thorough reading of the Act, however,
makes it apparent that the legislators were unwilling to accept the
enormous social costs which this position, if taken seriously, would
entail. 63 As a result, the stated goal is merely a politically attractive
mask for a policy which is similar to the one pursued on the Delaware.
As an interim measure, the EPA is to require all industrial dis-
chargers to install the "best practicable control technology currently
available"M64 by 1977. Although what is "practicable" is not self-
defining, and the Agency is given considerable discretion in formulat-
ciencies whose dimensions we have only hinted at. See generally text accompanying note
179 infra.
'
6 9 For a detailed consideration of the Act, see Zener, The Federal Law of Water
Pollution Control, in ENvRoNM:ENTAL LAw INsTrruTE, FEDERAL ENRmoNmENTA LAW 1
(draft ed. 1973).
160 33 U.S.C.A. § 1314(b) (1) (B) (Supp. 1973).
161 The Nader report on the Reserve Mining case, 1 NADER TASK FORCE REPORT ON
WATER POLLUTION-WVATER WASTELAND ch. 7 (prelim. draft 1971), addresses a classic
example of the circumstances under which stringent standards would be appropriate.
162 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a) (1) (Supp. 1973).
163 See, e.g., H.R. REP., supra note 158, at 103.
164 33 U.S.CA. § 1311(b) (1) (A) (i) (Supp. 1973).
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ing precise requirements, 6 5 it seems likely that industry will in general
be required to construct facilities-like those currently being installed
along the Delaware-which will attempt to eliminate most oxygen de-
manding material.
166
By 1983, Congress demands that industrial dischargers achieve
the "best available technology."' 67 While this formula seems relatively
unambiguous, the statute muddies the waters by indicating that only
the "best available technology" which is "economically achievable"
need be required. 6 ' This caveat must be read in light of Congress'
recognition in the legislative history of the Amendments that treat-
ment costs increase dramatically as requirements become more de-
manding, and that the cost of complete elimination of discharges may
be unreasonable.'6 9 Thus, even though the 1983 limitations will be
somewhat more stringeAt than those currently applied by the DRBC,
one cannot be sure how much greater severity the EPA will consider
reasonable in 1983. Moreover, even if the 1983 limitations are quite
stringent, it is not at all clear that the cutbacks ordered pursuant to
the statutory mandate will generate a DO profile on the Delaware any
better than the one contemplated by the current DRBC program. As
we have seen, 7 ° the wasteload to be treated along the Delaware will
increase substantially due to the growth of existing dischargers and the
entry of new ones. 7' Thus, on the assumption that the DRBC suc-
165 In determining what is "practicable," the Administrator of EPA is to take into
account "the total cost of application of technology in relation to the effluent reduction
benefits to be achieved from such application. .. ." Id. § 1314(b) (1) (B).
166 In the jargon of the engineering profession these are called high-level secondary
treatment facilities. Although these plants reduce carbonaceous oxygen demand by about
90%, nitrogenous oxygen demand is typically reduced by only 337o. For the importance
of this point, see Ackerman & Sawyer, supra note 1, at 457-60.
Our suspicion that "best practicable treatment" will be construed to require secon-
dary treatment would seem to find some basis in the statutory command that towns and
municipalities install secondary treatment by the same deadline. 33 U.S.C.A. §
1311(b) (1) (B) (Supp. 1973), although there is nothing in the statute which forbids
imposing higher interim standards on firms than on municipalities, and in fact the Act's
strategy for the 1980's explicitly contemplates a heavier burden on industry, see note 167
infra. In any event, a more precise definition of the statutory command will be avail-
able from EPA by the end of the current year.
167 33 U.S.C.A. § 1311(b) (2) (A) (Supp. 1973).
In contrast, municipalities are only required to install the "best practicable waste
treatment technology." Id. §§ 1311(b) (2) (B), 1281(g) (2) (A). Thus, for rivers like the
Delaware, where municipally owned plants contribute 2/3 of the total oxygen-demanding
load, the impact of the 1983 standards on water quality will be even less substantial
than is suggested by the text accompanying notes 170-71 infra.
1
6 8 Id. § 1311(b) (2) (A).
169 See, e.g., H.R. REP., supra note 158, at 103.
1 70 See text accompanying notes 27-37 supra.
171 For new sources, regardless of the date they begin discharging, the Act requires
"the best available demonstrated control technology . . . including where practicable, a
standard permitting no discharge of pollutants." 33 U.S.C.A. § 1316(a) (1) (Supp. 1973).
The difference between the "best available demonstrated technology" and "best avail-
able technology" is unclear. Cf. Zener, supra note 159, at 28-29. For a discussion of
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ceeds in enforcing its mandate under the federal Act, a generation of
expensive effort will culminate in 1983 in a river whose improved
quality will produce benefits only of the magnitude we have suggested.
Fortunately, the draftsmen of the statute have foreseen this
unhappy possibility and have provided that where "water quality in a
specific portion of the navigable waters [does not] assure . . . the
protection and propagation of a balanced population of shellfish, fish
and wildlife, and allow recreational activities in and on the water,"
treatment facilities even better than "the best available" are to be
required.'72 Having driven their commitment to cleanliness-at-any-price
to the point of semantic absurdity, the draftsmen pause to permit the
EPA to consider whether better than the best must be imposed in
every single case. Upon finding that the "best available" will not do,
the EPA must hold a hearing "to determine the relationship of the
economic and social costs of achieving any such [greater] limitation
. . . to the social and economic benefits to be obtained .... ;7173
If any individual discharger can show that there is "no reasonable
relationship, '117 the EPA will permit the "best available" technology
to suffice in his particular case. The scientific and economic arguments
presented in this and our previous Articles suggest that the dischargers
of oxygen-demanding wastes along the "most polluted" regions of the
Delaware and similar rivers should have little difficulty in making out
a case even under this demanding "no relationship" test.
By 1984, then, polluters may free themselves from the require-
ment that treatment better than the "best available" be attained.
Unfortunately, however, the larger social tragedy cannot be evaded
by invoking newspeak. Billions will have been wasted in a spurious
war on "pollution" which could have been devoted to constructing a
sounder relationship between industrialized society and the natural
environment.'
7 5
EPA's rather liberal notion of what will pass muster under the name of "best available
demonstrated technology," see 3 BNA [Current Developments] ENv. L. REP. 1552 (1973).
17233 U.S.C.A. § 1312(a) (Supp. 1973).
1 73
1d. § 1312(b)(1).
174 Id. § 1312(b) (2) (emphasis added).
175 In addition to the programs considered in the text, the Act provides EPA with
the tools required to limit stringently the discharge of hazardous substances. Id. §§ 1317,
1321. The operative standards for action by EPA are, however, rather vague. For ex-
ample,
the Administrator . . . shall publish a proposed effluent standard . . . for [toxic]
pollutant[s] ... which shall take into account the toxicity of the pollutant, its
persistence, degradability, the usual or potential presence of the affected orga-
nisms in any waters, the importance of the affected organisms and the nature
and extent of the effect of the toxic pollutant on such organisms ....
Id. § 1317(a)(2). Moreover, the Administrator is instructed that "[amny effluent stan-
dard . . . shall . . . [provide] an ample margin of safety," id. § 1317(a) (4), though he
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To bring this misdirection of concern into sharper focus, compare
the multibillion-dollar effort to construct facilities to treat oxygen-
demanding wastes by 1977176 with the nation's financial commitment
to other environmental priorities which our analysis has revealed are
far more pressing.' First, in the control of poisons even the advances
made by the 1972 Amendments seem inadequate. Although recent
legislation grants the EPA ample power to limit or entirely ban harm-
ful pollutants,178 the Agency is not given authority to subsidize firms
that are particularly hard hit by stringent controls, or otherwise
to ameliorate the substantial dislocations caused by plant shutdowns.
The significance of this omission is suggested by a paradigmatic case
which has received a great deal of publicity. Recently, the EPA dis-,
covered that discharges of asbestos by the Reserve Mining Company
posed a threat to the water supply of the inhabitants of Duluth,
Minnesota. The Agency now is considering whether to impose controls
on Reserve, which the company claims will close down twenty percent
of the taconite production of the United States, and lead to the unem-
ployment of 3,200 and the devastation of the one-industry town of
Silver Bay, Minnesota, population 3,272.'9 If such choices must be
made, it is likely that the EPA will often (if not always) choose to
save jobs by watering down the limitations it imposes upon dischargers
is not told explicity how much risk can be tolerated consistently with a commitment to
"safety," nor whether the discharge must be "safe" only for humans or for other beings
as well. As we have suggested, we are in favor of a vigorous program to control haz-
ardous substances of all sorts. We only fear that this effort will not be forthcoming, pre-
cisely because the amendment's other commands will divert a large portion of the energy
and resources which can be plausibly allocated to environmental issues. Indeed, as we
have noted before, note 158 supra, much remains to be done even in the preliminary
task of establishing an adequate monitoring system.
The effectiveness promised by these provisions of the Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments should be compared to the potential bite of the proposed Safe Drinking
Water Act of 1973, S. 433, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), which represents the first move
by Congress to establish comprehensive national standards for drinking water. This pro-
posal would require the Administrator of EPA to prescribe standards which establish
the maximum permissible levels for any contaminants which may exist in any
public water system in the United States which may cause or transmit disease,
chemical poisoning, or other impairments to man, allowing adequate margins of
safety ....
Id. § 4(b) (1) (A). This mandate, which gains further specificity from a definition
of "contaminant" elsewhere in the bill, id. § 3(4), promises much better results than that
contained in the Amendments, which do not define "toxic pollutants" or specify the level
to which any pollutant which the Administrator brands "toxic" must be reduced.
176 Of the total $297.1 billion projected for pollution control expenditure between
1971 and 1980, $87.3 billion is slated for water pollution control. 3 CEQ ANN. RP.
276-77 (1972). Of this, $42.5 billion is scheduled for state and local treatment systems.
Conversations with officials of the CEQ on Aug. 16, 1973, revealed that almost all of
these funds will be expended for secondary treatment facilities, and suggested that a
similar pattern could be expected for industrial expenditures.
1 77 See text accompanying notes 152-58 supra.
178 See note 175 supra.
179 Telephone interview with Representative Blatnik's office, July 17, 1973.
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of poison.180 In contrast, if a partial subsidy were possible, or if the
Agency could successfully assist in meaningful relocation and reem-
ployment efforts, it could act aggressively on behalf of Duluth without
utterly destroying Silver Bay. Of course, subsidies will sometimes be
misused, as companies or towns claim falsely that they are in dire
need of assistance. Nevertheless, if one seriously wishes to embark
upon a stringent ppison-control strategy, it would seem this is a risk
which is worth taking so long as institutional safeguards are created to
minimize cheating. By failing to address the subsidy question seriously,
we fear that the 1972 Amendments again promise far more than they
will deliver.
A second item which we have given high priority may also be
slighted by the environmental revolution wrought by recent statutes.
Existing programs to protect and expand wilderness areas in the United
States remain relatively undeveloped. Although a Wild and Scenic
Rivers Preservation Act is on the books,' 8 ' the program remains
underfunded,8 2  as do other federal wilderness programs. 3  More
generally, the management of our national lands leaves much to be
380 It should be recalled that the Agency is given a good deal of discretion in limit-
ing poisonous discharges. See note 175 supra.
181 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1271-87 (Supp. 1973).
182 Only $17,000,000 was authorized to be appropriated for acquisitions under the
1968 Act, and when that is used up, a new authorization act will be needed, id. § 1287.
The program is administered jointly by the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior,
id. § 1274; the Secretary of Agriculture being involved primarily through his steward-
ship of the National Forests, 16 U.S.C. § 471 (1970). It is difficult to determine how
much money has been appropriated in fact, as lands acquired by the Department of the
Interior become part of either the National Park or National Wildlife Refuge Systems,
16 U.S.C.A. § 1281(c) (Supp. 1973), and are funded by Interior either out of the appro-
priation for National Park acquisitions, which amounted to $76,871,000 in 1973, 86 Stat.
508, 512 (1972), the appropriation for land acquisition by the Bureau of Sport Fisheries
and Wildlife, amounting to $4,602,000 in 1973, id., or the $1,829,000 made available for
the same purpose to the Bureau of Land Management, id. For a detailed breakdown see
S. REP. No. 92-921, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1972). The Department of Agriculture
could acquire land in the program through the $29,655,000 appropriated for Forest Ser-
vice acquisitions, 86 Stat. 508 (1972). Finally, the Secretary of Agriculture received
$7,648,000 in fiscal 1973, not classified under any budget category, which is presumably
available for this program. 86 Stat. 591 (1972). The Forest Service was slated to receive
$1,816,000 for "National Wild and Scenic Rivers," but this was eliminated in committee.
S. REP. No. 92-921, 92d Cong., 2d Seas. 9 (1972). The total federal land acquisition
budget for 1973 was $98,257,000, though appropriations totalled $112,957,000. Id.; 86
Stat. 508, 512 (1973).
183 The National Wilderness Preservation System gets no funds, since lands brought
into the System remain under the ownership and management of their donors, 16 U.S.C.A.
§ 1131(b) (Supp. 1973). Although in 1972 some 1,300,000 acres of existing federal lands
were proposed for inclusion in the wilderness network, 3 CEQ ANN. REP. 141 (1972),
the significance of this potential addition to the 10,400,000 acres already classified as
wilderness must be assessed in light of the federal government's ownership of more than
750,000,000 acres of the nation's land, PuBLIc LAND LAW REVIEW COMm'N, ON Tman
OF THE NATIoN's LAND 22 (1970) [hereinafter cited as NATION'S LA]. As the title of
the cited study suggests, about 1/3 of the land in the United States is owned by the
federal government, id. x. It should be noted, however, that 95% of Alaska is federally
owned, and this makes up almost half the federal holdings, id. 22. The Forest Service
received $539,000 in 1973 for "wilderness and primitive areas." S. REP. No. 92-921, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1972). The Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife received $100,000
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desired from a naturalist's point of view, and it remains far from
clear that recent efforts to rethink policy in this area will improve the
situation.184
Finally, planning for the expansion of meaningful recreational
opportunities for the urban masses remains confused and fragmentary.
On the national level, there has been only slow development of
significant projects, like the proposal to create a national seashore in
New York City.'85 Nor has there been substantial development of
the national park program. 88 Although events on the local and state
levels are more difficult to trace, available estimates of gross expendi-
tures suggest that a substantial expansion of recreational opportunities
is not high on local agendas.187
In sum, the nation's environmental program for the 1970's is
based upon the same confused notion of the relationship between
urbanized man and Nature that afflicted the DRBC's efforts in the
1960's. The modest but conceptually sound technocratic studies that
might have helped dispel this confusion have not materialized. There
for "wilderness," id. 10. An additional $1,650,000 was budgeted for wilderness protection
and acquisition, but this was eliminated by the House Appropriations Committee. H.R.
REP. No. 92-1119, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16 (1972).
184 The basic study in this area is NATION'S LAND, supra note 183. The report ana-
lyzes policy for the management of federal lands at a truly olympian level of generality,
advocating planning of land uses "to obtain the greatest net public benefit." Id. 45. The
Commission accepts the current "multiple-use" statutory structure, id. 44-46, although it
has been cogently argued that the multiple-use system does not provide a sound basis for
federal land management. See, e.g., Note, Managing Federal Lands: Replacing the Mul-
tiple-Use System, 82 YALE L.J. 787, 788-95 (1973).
185 See 3 CEQ ANN. REP. 139 (1972). The Gateway National Recreation Area was
finally established in Oct. 1972, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 460cc to 460cc-4 (Supp. 1973) ; a similar
area was established near San Francisco at the same time, id. §§ 460bb to 460bb-5. These
areas are just 2 among perhaps several dozen national seashore and recreation areas,
each created by a separate act of Congress and each subject to different sets of uses and
conditions negotiated at the time of acquisition. There is no apparent comprehensive na-
tional plan for the development of these areas. Instead, each project is lobbied through
Congress in an ad hoc fashion and receives money for acquisitions in yearly increments.
186 Thirteen National Parks and National Historic Parks have been authorized by
individual acts of Congress since 1960. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 79a-j, 90 to 90e-3, 160-60k, 271-
71g, 272-72f, 273-73f, 281-81f, 282-82c, 283-83e, 284-84b, 291-91b, 396, 410y to 410y-6
(Supp. 1973). Of the 4 which have been authorized since 1970, 2 were merely changes
in the name of a previously existing park. 3 CEQ AN. REP. 317 (Table 1 nn.2, 4
(1972)). Congressional authorization does not suffice, in and of itself, to bring a park
into existence. At least 2, and perhaps as many as 7, of the parks which have been au-
thorized since 1960 were not established as of August 1972. Id. 317.
A number of National Recreation Areas and National Seashore Recreational Areas
have been authorized since 1960. See, e.g., note 185 supra. Again the bare fact of au-
thorization does not mean that such areas have actually been established. Specific appro-
priations must be made and the land actually acquired before the area is truly established.
187 This is not to deny that some significant activity is taking place. The National
Recreation and Parks Association estimated that states spent $348,100,000 on state parks
in 1970, $71,700,000 of which went for acquisition of new lands. 3 CEQ ANN. REP. 189
(1972). These outlays were doubtlessly enhanced in many cases by federal matching
funds from the Department of Interior's Land and Water Conservation Fund. See id.
138. Nevertheless, even doubled, the $71,700,000 for acquisitions does not represent a
level of expenditure which is in any way sufficient to meet expanding recreational de-
mand.
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remains the possibility, however, that technocratic tools may still be
marshalled to shape sound policy. Section 305(b) (1) (D) of the
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments requires an annual esti-
mate from the states of "the economic and social costs necessary
to achieve the objectives of this chapter" and "the economic and
social benefits of such achievement . ... ,111 "[T]he Administrator
is expected to support the States in these efforts through full use of
other authorities contained in the bill."'18 The Amendments also
create a National Study Commission which is to make a "study of
• ..all aspects of the total economic, social, and environmental effects
of achieving or not achieving" the 1983 goals; 190 the Commission,
two-thirds of which is composed of members of Congress,19' may
contract with outside groups in making their study'92 and must
report their findings to Congress by 1975.3 If the states and the
EPA take their mandate seriously and prove willing to commit
significant resources to the production of intellectually defensible
estimates, or if the National Study Commission proves able, despite
its essentially political makeup, to orchestrate the sophisticated survey
called for by the Amendments, the results may sway a Congress
whose misguided efforts have only been reinforced up to this point
by analyses of the sort to which this Article has devoted its attention.
APPENDIX A
DERIVING CLEANUP COST ESTIMATES FOR INDIVIDUAL
POLLUTERS ALONG THE ESTUARY
The DECS staff estimated the cost functions of each of the
estuary's forty-four major dischargers to determine the costs of a
variety of plausible cleanup proposals. The staff, however, maintained
a policy of confidentiality which was intended to make it impossible
to associate individual cost estimates with particular polluters. Thus,
when researchers asked for data, cost figures were provided which did
not identify each. of the forty-four dischargers by name, but only by
an arbitrarily selected number. Nevertheless, a complex set of
inferences from documents made available to us has made it possible
to identify each of the forty-four polluters' cost data with precision.
188 33 U.S.C.A. § 1315(b) (1) (D) (Supp. 1973).
189 H.R. RIP., supra note 158, at 110.
19033 U.S.C.A. § 1325(a) (Supp. 1973).
1911d. § 1325(b).
1
92
d. § 1325(c).
193Id. § 1325(e).
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Since a number of the statements we have made are based on them,
these inferences are elaborated here, along with the various sets of cost
data made available by the DECS. In keeping with the DECS policy,
however, we have not identified polluters by name.
To understand the following table, it is necessary to recognize
that the DECS staff have at various times provided their cost data on
individual polluters to researchers. Grant Schaumberg obtained data in
1966, Glenn Graves and his coworkers in 1967, and the present authors
in 1970. Grant Schaumberg kindly provided us with his data set, and
Graves' data is available in an article authored by Graves, Whinston
and Hatfield.' In each data set, dischargers are identified by number,
and the marginal cost of removing waste over specified ranges is
reported in dollars per pound per day. Both Schaumberg's data and
that provided to us by the DECS separate capital and operating costs.
Schaumberg's information also includes data indicating the state in
which each polluter is located, its river section, and whether it is a
municipality or a firm. Graves' data reports the level of discharge in
1964. Graves, Hatfield and Whinston also present a map of the estuary,
which shows the location of each polluter along the river.' The pollu-
ters are numbered differently in each set of information, but the
basic ranking is from upstream to downstream.
From the DRBC we know the identity of the largest dischargers
and their locations along the river. We also know each polluter's esti-
mated 1964 raw load as recorded by the DRBC, and the wasteload
allocations each has received. Combining all of this information made
it possible to identify each of the forty-four polluters by name,
reconcile the disparate numbering systems so that changes in the
data could be analyzed, and determine what levels of waste removal
were indicated by the data points. Once this had been done it was a
simple matter to calculate the polluter-by-polluter costs of reaching
the DRBC allocations, or any other allocation pattern that specified
either percentage or tonnage removal in advance. The accompanying
table summarizes this information. It is important to remember that
the cost figures given here are not the total costs of treating all wastes,
but only the costs of reducing 1964 discharges. The cost of reaching
the DRBC allocation is $289 million with Schaumberg's data, $301
million with Graves', and $267 million with the DECS staff's 1970
list. These estimates are close to, but consistently higher than, the cost
of $225 million reported in Where Man and Water Meet. Thus there
may be minor misspecifications included in the currint estimates.
I Water Pollution Control Using Bypass Piping, 5 WATER REsOURcES RESEARcH 27
(1969).2 Id.
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NOTES TO TABLE A
3 The numbering system is that used for the Graves et al. data and for the 1970
data obtained from the DECS. In cases where Schaumberg's data is numbered differently
his numbers are given in parentheses.
4 M = Municipality
I = Industry
5 P = Pennsylvania
NJ = New Jersey
D = Delaware
6 Section of river. The DECS divided the estuary from Trenton to Liston Point into
30 sections, see Fig. 2 accompanying note 11 supra.
7 S = Schaumberg
G = Graves, Whinston & Hatfield
D = Data supplied to authors by the DECS staff in 1970
8 
Yt = Total additional capital costs to remove L,
Annual
01 & M = Annual operating and maintenance costs of removing L,
Tot, = K, plus (0 & M) discounted at 3% for 20 years [(O i & M t) x 14.9]
Li = Additional load removed over and above other lower numbered data points
and 1964 discharge.
9 Pounds of oxygen demanding waste (FSUOD) per day. Where 2 figures for 1964
discharge are given the first is the discharge reported in the Graves data and the second
is a revised figure used by the DRBC. When only 1 load is given, the 2 sources agree
except as noted. In general the cost figures provided to us by the DECS staff are con-
sistent with the revised DRBC discharge data because where the discharge has been
changed the loadings have also changed, generally so as to keep the percent removals
unchanged. One interesting aspect of these changes is that when the load is increased
or-decreased, the total cost of reaching that level of percent removal remains unchanged.
Consider for example the polluters numbered 8, 12, 15, 19, 21, 25, 26 and 30. Except for
dischargers 9 and 20, Graves' data is used where only 1 set of cost estimates exists and"
the 2 discharge estimates differ, since these figures were more consistent with the cost
data. For numbers 9 and 20 the differences in reported discharges were small, and the
DRBC data appeared more consistent with the cost estimates.
1OPounds of oxygen demanding waste removed as percentage of total pounds pro-
duced per day. DRBC data.
"1Pounds of oxygen demanding waste (FSUOD) per day. Delaware River Basin
Commission-Final Allocations, Delaware River Estuary, June 1968.
12 Graves' data, revised figure is 1810.
18 Graves' data, firm is now out of business.
14 DRBC data, Graves reports 125,250.
-5 Actually, Schaumberg reports 2 data points, the first removing 6,264 pounds and
the second 14,409.
16 Revised to 21,350 by Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 21,925 on DRBC list.
17 Revised to 17,615 by Pennsylvania, 12,900 on DRBC list.
I8 DRBC data, Graves reports 156,200.
19 Graves' data and figure on DREC list, revised by Pennsylvania to 12,565.
20 Graves data. DRBC reports 4,700, revised by Pennsylvania to 16,000.
21 Graves' data, DRBC reports 1890.
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APPENDIX B
THE MYSTERY OF THE DECS BENEFIT ESTIMATES
OF PICNICKING AND POLLUTION CONTROL
According to the DECS, the only quantifiable recreation benefits
are due to enhanced possibilities for swimming, fishing and boating.
As one important property of scientific results is that they should be
reproducible, we set out to duplicate the DECS benefits estimates.
This attempt led us to examine more closely the study, performed by
the Institute for Environmental Studies (IES) at the University of
Pennsylvania, upon which the DECS benefits estimates are based.'
We applied the DECS staff's discounting procedure to the net benefits
which the IES asserted would arise from enhanced swimming, fishing
and boating opportunities in 1976, generated by each of the proposed
water improvement programs, above those associated with Program V
(maintaining current conditions). The results are shown in the two
columns of Table B labeled "IES SFB." The net benefit estimates
from the DECS are reproduced for comparison. The discrepancy is
striking. Comparing the maximum estimates, we find that the IES
estimates range from twelve percent of the DECS estimate for Pro-
gram IV to thirty percent of the DECS estimate for Program I. What
accounts for this divergence?
TABLE B
NET BENEFIT ESTIMATES BY SOURCE
(PRESENT VALUE, MILLIONS OF 1964 DOLLARS,
DISCOUNTED AT 3% FOR TWENTY YEARS)
DECS
Preliminary IES IES
Program Report SFB2  SFBP3
max. nin. max. min. max. rin.
I 355 155 107 64 307 182
II 320 135 66 40 224 145
III 310 125 62 36 219 141
IV 280 115 34 24 103 70
Because neither the DECS Report nor our interviews with the
1 IES STuDY, supra note 63.
2 Institute for Environmental Studies-swimming, fishing and boating benefit esti-
mates.
3 Institute for Environmental Studies--swimming, fishing, boating and picnicking
benefit estimates.
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DECS staff suggest that the IES swimming, fishing or boating esti-
mates were revised dramatically, it seemed plausible to suspect that-
despite the Report's contrary statement-some other kind of recre-
ational benefit was taken into account in the figures provided by the
DECS. This hypothesis gained credibility from our inspection of the
IES Study upon which the DECS work was based. The Study attempts
to estimate the impact pollution control will have on a fourth activity,
picnicking, which is not mentioned in the DECS. By adding picnicking
benefits to those for swimming, fishing and boating, calculating net
benefit over Program V, and applying the DECS discounting procedure,
we arrive at the results presented in the two columns labeled "IES
SFBP" in Table B. A comparison of these estimates with the others
in the table reveals two important facts. First, when picnicking bene-
fits are included, the discounted IES estimates are much closer to
those presented in the DECS Report although a considerable dis-
crepancy remains. Comparing the maximum estimates, we find that
the discounted IES estimates range from thirty-seven percent of the
DECS estimates for Program IV to eighty-six percent of the DECS
estimates for Program I. Second, the IES estimates including picnick-
ing are, in general, about three times the IES estimates excluding pic-
nicking. Given the possible importance of picnicking in the DECS
estimates, we will consider the extent to which the economist would
consider it significant.
The impact of cleaner water on picnicking can be analyzed into
two component parts. First, although picnicking need not take place
near sparkling, odor-free water, some people may enjoy it more if it
does. Thus, pollution control may increase the value of the "pure
picnicking" experience. Second, some may find it more valuable to
picnic at a place where they can also swim, boat or fish. Thus, pollu-
tion control may redound to the benefit of those who engage in
"picnicking plus."
Having defined the relevant activities with sufficient precision,
we can now consider how the economist would evaluate them. As to
"pure picnicking," it is easy to see that the effect of pollution control
will be negligible. The odor of the river is not a significant problem
now, and the appearance of the river is not likely to be changed much
by pollution control. Pollution control will not alter the urban character
of the Trenton and Philadelphia-to-Wilmington areas. Thus, the quality
of the experience of "pure" picnicking by the Delaware will be
virtually unaltered by pollution control. Of course, more parks would
improve the opportunities for Delaware-type picnicking, but this
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observation suggests a cost-benefit analysis of parks, rather than of
pollution control.
Similarly, the impact of improved water quality on "picnicking
plus" will be but a small fraction of the "picnicking benefits" calcu-
lated in the IES Study. In applying the "sacrifice test" to "picnicking
plus" the analyst should ask: "How much extra will consumers sacrifice
so that they can picnic and fish (and boat and... ) at the same place
instead of picnicking and fishing (and . . .) in different places?" The
question is framed in this way because we have already estimated the
value consumers would place on "pure" picnicking, swimming, fishing
and boating when each activity is considered separately. Consequently,
to avoid double counting at this stage, we must only consider the extra
value people would place on participating in more than one of these
activities at the same place. As soon as this is recognized, we think.
it apparent that the DECS claim that picnicking benefits are three
times the benefits accruing from boating, fishing and swimming is
greatly overstated. It is implausible to assume that if a consumer will
sacrifice only one dollar for the opportunity to swim, boat and fish in
the Delaware, he will suddenly sacrifice three dollars simply because
he can also picnic in -a park close by. This is not to say that the
consumer may not sacrifice something for this extra amenity. But
surely this something will be only a fraction of the amount sacrificed
for the new boating, fishing and swimming opportunities, since
picnicking opportunities are available at a large number of parks
within easy reach of the river by car and bus.
Once again, then, we are driven to consider the way in which the
IES could have generated such enormous benefit figures for picnicking
activities. The result was achieved by applying the same procedure
we have presented and criticized in the text.4 The same artificially
restricted study area was canvassed for picnicking sites. These sites
were, not surprisingly, found to be inadequate to meet 1976 "demand"
for picnicking determined by the use of the ORRRC studies in the
manner described in the text. The IES Study then assumed that all
newly "available'.' parks, would be used to "capacity." A park site
was assumed to be "available" if water contact recreation could take
place in the estuary at that point under a given pollution control pro-
gram. Given the standards which the DECS used to determine whether
or not an area was suitable for water contact recreation, this criterion
for availability implies that all four of the recreational activities we
have considered must be possible under the DECS water quality pre-
4 See Section IV supra.
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dictions if a park is to be considered available. Thus for each pollution
control program, the total park capacity, measured in activity days,
was multiplied by the value of an activity day of picnicking to obtain
picnicking benefits for that pollution control program.
Since we are familiar with the shortcomings of the IES-DECS
approach from our earlier discussion, we would expect the benefits
from picnicking to be inflated, but even so, the absolute size of
picnicking benefits is so large that it calls for further scrutiny. The
explanation seems to lie in the IES method of calculation. After esti-
mating the number of acres of available parkland, IES assumed that
500 people, or given the relative age distribution at the time of the
study, 390 people over twelve years old, could be served by an acre of
park land. They then took an activity rate for people over twelve
for picnicking from an ORRRC study, 3.21 activity days per person
per year for 1976, and multiplied it by 390 to get their estimate of the
number of activity days which could be undertaken on each acre
per year, 1251.9 activity days per acre per year. If the staff of the IES
had applied the 1251.9 number to their own estimate of 24,000 acres of
already existing parkland in the study area, they would have found a
capacity of 30 million activity days. Previously, however, they had
estimated that demand for picnicking by the residents of the study
area would be only 16 million activity days. Thus, although the IES
staff argue that picnicking land will be scarce in the study area in
1976, their own capacity estimation procedure, even when applied to
existing acreage, suggests a capacity that is twice demand. Conse-
quently, it appears that the IES estimates of picnicking benefits are
grossly overstated, even if the Study's methodological premises are
granted.
